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Abstract
We build a theory of second-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition that
allows us to study the substitutive role of prices and qualities in increasing sales. A key feature
of our model is that consumers are heterogeneously informed about the o↵ers available in the
market, which leads to dispersion over price-quality menus in equilibrium. While firms are ex-
ante identical, their menus are ordered so that more generous menus leave more surplus uniformly
over consumer types. We generate empirical predictions by exploring the e↵ects of changes in
market fundamentals on the distribution of surplus across types, and pricing across products.
For instance, more competition may raise prices for low-quality goods; yet, consumers are better
o↵, as the qualities they receive also increase. The predictions of our model illuminate empirical
findings in many markets, such as those for cell phone plans, yellow-pages advertising, cable TV
and air travel.
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1 Introduction
Price discrimination through menus of products, exhibiting di↵erent combinations of quality and
price, is a widespread practice across many industries. Examples include flight tickets with di↵erent
terms and conditions, cell phone plans with increasing usage allowances, and television subscriptions
in basic and premium versions.
In these examples, the purchasing decisions of consumers depend on individual preferences as
well as on price and quality di↵erences across products. As noted by Jules Dupuit as early as 1849,
and later by Mussa and Rosen (1978), distortions in the provision of quality are a key feature of the
monopolistic optimum, as they help extract rents from consumers with high willingness to pay.1
In the presence of competition, the choice of price and qualities is bound to a↵ect the volume
of sales. Firms then have to design their menu of products accounting for consumers’ choices of
which firm to patronize, and which product to buy (within the firm menu). In this paper we build a
theory of second-degree price discrimination under imperfect competition which allows us to study
the substitutive role of prices and qualities in attracting consumers. Our theory generates a number
of testable predictions, and unveils di↵erent patterns of firm behavior regarding pricing and quality
provision under competition.
Our framework departs from existing theoretical work on second-degree price discrimination,
which assumes that consumers enjoy perfect (and therefore homogeneous) information about the
o↵ers available in the market. This literature postulates that imperfect competition is due to product
di↵erentiation; see Champsaur and Rochet (1989), Rochet and Stole (1997, 2002) and Armstrong
and Vickers (2001).2 Our focus on heterogeneously informed consumers also stands in contrast to
most of the large empirical literature on product di↵erentiation which follows the tradition of Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995).
That consumers are often heterogeneously informed about available o↵ers has long been recog-
nized as an important driver of market power by firms, and has been widely documented empirically
(see, for example, Chandra and Tappata (2011) and the references therein). Its importance for em-
pirical work studying consumer demand and industry conduct is now increasingly recognized (see,
for instance, Sovinsky Goeree (2008) and Draganska and Klapper (2011)). Theoretical work on com-
petitive price discrimination with heterogeneously informed consumers, however, has to date been
missing.
1The French engineer Jules Dupuit provided perhaps one of the first explanations of how quality distortions can
raise revenue. In the context of railway transportation, he writes that “there is a presumption that those who are
willing to make the largest sacrifice for their journey are also those who value their comfort most and who have their
carriages luxuriously appointed inside and out. So this is the treatment the company gives them. It also tries to guard
against their avarice, which might induce them to travel in a lower class, by di↵erentiating as much as possible the
comfort provided for passengers.” See page 24 in Dupuit (1849).
2See also Stole (2007) for a comprehensive survey.
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Model and Results
We consider a canonical model of second-degree price discrimination. To isolate the e↵ects of
information heterogeneity on competition, we assume that consumer tastes only di↵er with respect
to their valuation for quality (their “type”). That is, consumers have no “brand” preferences, and
so evaluate the o↵ers of di↵erent firms symmetrically. An o↵er is a menu of products, consisting
in di↵erent combinations of price and quality. Each consumer observes a random sample of menus
o↵ered by the competing firms, and purchases from the menu with the most attractive product
among those observed.
As in the early work on sample-size search, see Burdett and Judd (1983), we consider ex-ante
identical firms and anticipate that they will make di↵erent o↵ers in equilibrium. An equilibrium is
then a distribution over menus such that every menu in its support is a profit-maximizing response
to that distribution. As consumer preferences are private information, the menus o↵ered by firms
have to satisfy the self-selection (or incentive) constraints inherent to price discrimination.
It is useful to note that, were consumer preferences public information, all firms would provide
quality e ciently to each consumer type. The reason is that, holding constant consumer payo↵s,
firms’ profits would increase by setting qualities at their e cient levels. Under asymmetric informa-
tion, however, a firm’s choice of how much utility to leave to one type of consumer a↵ects its ability
to provide quality to other types, as incentive constraints must be satisfied. Such constraints create
a link between the products designed for each consumer type as well as their prices.
A key step in our analysis is to express incentive constraints and firms’ profits in terms of the
indirect utilities o↵ered to consumers. Doing so allows us to establish a crucial property of a firm’s
profit function: It satisfies increasing di↵erences in the indirect utility left to low and high types. To
understand why, note that leaving more indirect utility to high types relaxes incentive constraints, as
high types now consider the low-type product less attractive. The quality of the low-quality product
can therefore be raised without violating the high type’s incentive constraint. This, in turn, increases
the firms’ marginal profit associated with increasing the indirect utility left to low types, as marginal
sales generate greater surplus.
Building on this monotonicity property, we characterize an equilibrium of this economy, which,
under mild qualifications, is the unique one. This equilibrium, which we call the ordered equilibrium,
has the property that, for any two menus, one of them leaves more indirect utility uniformly across
types. Accordingly, firms sort themselves on how generous they are (i.e., how much indirect utility
they leave) to all consumer types. In equilibrium, all firms expect the same profits, as the less
generous ones make fewer sales to each consumer type.
To better understand the behavior of firms, we translate the equilibrium characterization (in
terms of indirect utilities) into properties of observable variables. Our analysis reveals that, while
price reductions are the only instrument of competition for high types, three patterns of competition
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for low-type consumers emerge. For firms of low generosity, extra sales are generated by increasing
both the quality and the price of the low-quality product. For firms of intermediate generosity,
courting consumers combines quality enhancements and price reductions. For firms of high generosity,
price reductions are the only instrument of competition for low types (as quality provision is e cient).
These patterns reflect the fact that more generous firms compete more evenly for di↵erent consumer
types, as the shadow costs of incentive constraints (and the associated distortions in quality provision)
go down with the generosity of the menu.
Empirical Implications
To connect our theory to empirical work on price discrimination, we generate testable predictions
exploring variations in market conditions. We consider increases in the degree of competition, as
modeled by consumers observing a (probabilistically) larger sample of o↵ers, and changes in the
distribution of consumer tastes.
First, we show that, if competition is not too intense, more competition raises prices for the low-
quality product. Intuitively, in a market close to monopoly, the quality of the low-type product is
heavily distorted; hence the surplus, and also the profits, from low-type sales are small. To increase
sales, firms are therefore willing to compete more aggressively for high types than for low types,
raising high-type payo↵s by more. This relaxes (downward) incentive constraints, and, as a result,
low-type qualities sharply increase (in the appropriate probabilistic sense), and so do low-type prices.
Second, markups decrease faster for high types than for low types as competition intensifies.
This follows from two observations. One is that high types benefit more from competition than low
types, for the reason explained above. The other is that, unlike for high types, much (in some cases,
all) of the higher payo↵s that low types obtain from more competition take the form of higher quality
provision, rather than lower prices.
Third, we assess the impact of variations in consumer tastes on quality provision and price dif-
ferentials within firms’ menus. We show that low-type qualities increase with the mass of low-type
consumers, and show that price di↵erentials are smaller (in the appropriate probabilistic sense) in
markets with either more competition or more low-type consumers. Moreover, the impact of com-
petition on price di↵erentials is stronger in markets with fewer low-type consumers. Intuitively, the
degree of competition and the fraction of low types work as substitutes for reducing price di↵erentials.
Although our model is not conceived to describe in detail any specific market, the predictions
above find empirical support in a range of examples, as we describe more extensively below. A case
in point is the US airline industry in the 1990s and early 2000s, as documented by Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009). This study provides evidence on the range of prices o↵ered by individual airlines on
di↵erent routes. Di↵erences in ticket characteristics, such as refundability and Saturday night stay-
over restrictions, seem to explain much of the variation in an airline’s prices on any given route (see
Sengupta and Wiggins, 2014, for evidence). Moreover, it appears there was significant heterogeneity
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in the information available to consumers about the airfares available in the market (again, see the
study by Sengupta and Wiggins).3
In line with our theoretical results, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find that entry by a new carrier
on a given route is associated with a reduction in the variation in competitors’ ticket prices on that
route, due largely to a reduction in the highest ticket prices. The reduction is greatest on routes that
seem a priori likely to have the highest proportion of business (or “high-valuation”) passengers. We
are unaware of empirical findings on how ticket restrictions (and the pricing of restricted tickets) vary
with competition. However, Mazzeo (2003) does observe a positive correlation between an airline’s
on-time performance and the intensity of competition on a given route, which seems to suggest a
positive influence of competition on quality. In Section 4, we relate the predictions of our model to
empirical findings in other markets, such as those for cell phone plans, yellow-pages advertising, and
cable TV.
Paper Outline
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Below, we close the introduction by briefly reviewing
the most pertinent literature. Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 characterizes equilibrium,
focusing for analytical ease on the space of utilities that consumers derive from equilibrium menus.
Section 4 then translates the findings in Section 3 into key economic implications, and relates them
to existing empirical findings. Section 5 describes some possible extensions to our baseline model,
and Section 6 concludes. All proofs are in the Appendix at the end of the document.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper brings the theory of nonlinear pricing under asymmetric information (Mussa and Rosen
(1978), Maskin and Riley (1984) and Goldman, Leland and Sibley (1984)) to a competitive set-
ting where consumers are heterogeneously informed about the o↵ers made by firms. Other related
literature is described below.
Competition in Nonlinear Pricing. This article primarily contributes to the literature
that studies imperfect competition in nonlinear pricing schedules when consumers make exclusive
purchasing decisions (exclusive agency). In one strand of this literature, firms’ market power stems
from comparative advantages for serving consumer segments. In Stole (1995) such comparative
3Although developments in e-commerce, such as price comparison websites and online booking, would seem to imply
improvements in consumers’ information about available fares in the later years of the study, Sengupta and Wiggins’
study suggests information remained imperfect. In particular, they find in 2004 data that many air tickets were
booked o↵-line, and that travelers booking o↵-line paid a systematically higher price (about 11 per cent higher on
average), apparently because of inferior information about the available fares. Also related, Clemons, Hann and Hitt
(2002) find significant price dispersion among online travel agents in 1997, and argue that search frictions are a natural
explanation.
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advantages are exogenous, whereas in Champsaur and Rochet (1989) they are endogenous, as firms
can commit to a range of qualities before choosing prices.
Another strand of this literature generates market power by assuming that goods are horizontally
di↵erentiated, i.e. consumers have preferences over brands; see Spulber (1989) for a one-dimensional
model where consumers are distributed on a Salop circle, and Rochet and Stole (1997, 2002), Arm-
strong and Vickers (2001), and Yang and Ye (2008) for multi-dimensional models where brand
preferences enter utility additively. These papers study symmetric equilibria, and show that (i) the
equilibrium outcome under duopoly often lies between the monopoly and the perfectly competitive
outcome, and that (ii) when brand preferences are narrowly dispersed, quality provision may be fully
e cient with cost-plus-fixed-fee pricing prevailing.4
Our model presents several advantages relative to the aforementioned papers. First, it parsi-
moniously explains di↵erent firm behavior on how to compete for consumers. Indeed, the ability
to describe various responses to competition (in terms of price and quality decisions) highlights the
tractability of our model. In the horizontal-di↵erentiation literature mentioned above, results analo-
gous to those of this paper (e.g., comparative statics on the degree of competition) are analytically
elusive.
Second, the Hotelling-Salop approach of the aforementioned papers conflates changes in the
degree of competition with changes in the outside option (as changes in “transportation costs”
simultaneously a↵ect the consumer choice between any two firms, and between any given firm and
not consuming the good).5 Our model isolates changes purely in the competitiveness of the market,
contributing to its greater tractability.6
There is, of course, other work recognizing that consumers may not be perfectly informed about
o↵ers in competitive settings.7 The works of Verboven (1999) and Ellison (2005) depart from the
benchmark of perfect consumer information by assuming that consumers observe the baseline prices
o↵ered by all firms, but have to pay a search cost to observe the price of upgrades (or add-on prices).
The focus of these papers is on the strategic consequences of the hold-up problem faced by consumers
once their store choices are made. By taking quality provision as exogenous, these papers ignore
the mechanism design issues that are at the core of the present article. Katz (1984) studies a model
of price discrimination where a measure of low-value consumers are uninformed about prices while
other consumers are perfectly informed. Heterogeneity of information thus takes a very particular
4See Borenstein (1985), Wilson (1993) and Borenstein et al (1994) for numerical results in closely related settings.
5See Be´nabou and Tirole (2016) for further discussion of this point.
6Relatedly, understanding the impact of entry in a spatial model typically requires modeling the detailed spatial
structure of the market. Our alternative approach simply views an increase in the number of firms as stochastically
increasing the number of o↵ers each consumer receives.
7There is also work where consumers have imperfect information about o↵ers in the absence of competition. Most
closely related to our paper, Villas-Boas (2004) studies monopoly price discrimination where consumers randomly
observe either some or all elements of the menu.
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form in this model, and price dispersion does not arise (when quantity discounting is permitted, a
unique price schedule is o↵ered in equilibrium).
Assuming perfect consumer information, Stole (1991) and Ivaldi and Martimort (1994) study
duopolistic competition in nonlinear price schedules when consumers can purchase from more than
one firm (common agency).8 In a related setting, Calzolari and Denicolo (2013) study the welfare
e↵ects of contracts for exclusivity and market-share discounts (i.e., discounts that depend on the
seller’s share of a consumer’s total purchases). The analysis of these papers is relevant for markets
where goods are divisible and/or exhibit some degree of complementarity, whereas our analysis is
relevant for markets where exclusive purchases are prevalent (e.g., most markets for durable goods).
Price Dispersion. We borrow important insights from the seminal papers of Butters (1977),
Salop and Stiglitz (1977), Varian (1980) and Burdett and Judd (1983), that study oligopolistic
competition in settings where consumers are di↵erently informed about the prices o↵ered by firms.
In these papers, there is complete information about consumer preferences, and firms compete only
on prices.9 Relative to this literature, we introduce asymmetric information about consumers’ tastes,
and allow firms to compete on price and quality.
Competing Auctioneers. McAfee (1993), Peters (1997), Peters and Severinov (1997) and
Pai (2012) study competition among principals who propose auction-like mechanisms. These papers
assume that buyers perfectly observe the sellers’ mechanisms, and that the meeting technology
between buyers and sellers is perfectly non-rival. This last assumption is relaxed by Eeckhout and
Kircher (2010), who show that posted prices prevail in equilibrium if the meeting technology is
su ciently rival. A key ingredient of these papers is that sellers face capacity constraints (each seller
has one indivisible good to sell), and o↵er homogenous goods whose quality is exogenous. Our paper
di↵ers from this literature in three important respects. First, sellers in our model control both the
price and the quality of the good to be sold. Second, we assume away capacity constraints. Third,
buyers are heterogeneously informed about the o↵ers made by sellers.
Search and Matching. Inderst (2001) embeds the setup of Mussa and Rosen (1978) in a
dynamic matching environment, where sellers and buyers meet pairwise and, in each match, each side
may be chosen to make a take-it-or-leave o↵er. His main result shows that ine ciencies vanish when
frictions (captured by discounting) are su ciently small, thus providing a foundation for perfectly
competitive outcomes.10 Frictions in our model have a di↵erent nature (they are informational).
Faig and Jerez (2005) study the e↵ect of buyers’ private information in a general equilibrium
model with directed search. They show that if sellers can use two-tier pricing, private information
8See Stole (2007) for a comprehensive survey of the common agency literature.
9See, however, Grossman and Shapiro (1984) where consumers not only have heterogeneous information about o↵ers,
but also about brand preferences. Firms compete in prices and advertising intensities, but do not price discriminate.
10In contrast, Inderst (2004) shows that if frictions a↵ect agents’ utilities through type-independent costs of search
(or waiting), equilibrium contracts are always first-best.
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has no bite, and the equilibrium allocation is e cient. In turn, Guerrieri, Shimer and Wright (2010)
show that private information leads to ine ciencies in a directed-search environment with common
values. Our model is closer to Faig and Jerez (2005), as we study private values. In contrast to Faig
and Jerez (2005), our model leads to menu dispersion and distortions.
In work subsequent to ours, Lester et al (2015) introduce information heterogeneity in a common-
values setting where seller types are privately known. They show that an ordered equilibrium also
exists in their environment, and study the welfare e↵ects of market interventions common in insurance
and financial markets. Finally, our paper is also related to Moen and Rose´n (2011), who introduce
private information on match quality and e↵ort choice in a labor market with search frictions. We
focus on private information about willingness to pay (which is the same for all firms), while workers
have private information about the match-specific shock in their model.
2 Model and Preliminaries
The economy is populated by a unit-mass continuum of consumers with single-unit demands for a
vertically di↵erentiated good. If a consumer with valuation per quality ✓ purchases a unit of the
good with quality q at a price x, his utility is
u(q, x, ✓) ⌘ ✓ · q   x.
Consumers are heterogeneous in their valuations per unit of quality: the valuation of each consumer
is an iid draw from a discrete distribution with support {✓l, ✓h}, where  ✓ ⌘ ✓h   ✓l > 0, and
associated probabilities pl and ph, with pl, ph > 0 (and pl + ph = 1). Consumers privately observe
their valuations per unit of quality. The utility from not buying the good is normalized to zero.
A unit-mass continuum of firms compete by posting menus of contracts with di↵erent combina-
tions of quality and price. Firms have no capacity constraints and share a technology that exhibits
constant returns to scale. The per-unit profit of a firm which sells a good with quality q at a price
x is
x  '(q),
where '(q) is the per-unit cost to the firm of providing quality q. We assume that '(·) is twice con-
tinuously di↵erentiable, strictly increasing and strictly convex, with '(0) = '0(0) = 0. Furthermore,
we require that limq!1 '0(q) =1, which guarantees that surplus-maximizing qualities are interior.
We assume that firms’ o↵ers stipulate simply that consumers choose a combination of quality
and price from a menu of options. Given the absence of capacity constraints, a consumer is assured
to receive his choice. We thus rule out stochastic mechanisms as well as mechanisms which condition
on the choices of other buyers or on the o↵ers of other firms.11 Given our restriction to menus of
11There is no loss of generality in considering deterministic mechanisms, provided that one assumes that each con-
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price-quality pairs, it is without loss of generality to suppose firms’ menus include only two pairs:
M ⌘ ((ql, xl) , (qh, xh)) ⇢ (R+ ⇥ R)2 , where (qk, xk) is the contract designed for the type k 2 {l, h}.12
Furthermore, every menu has to satisfy the following incentive-compatibility constraints: For each
type k 2 {l, h},
ICk : u(qk, xk, ✓k) = max
kˆ2{l,h}
✓k · qkˆ   xkˆ.
This constraint requires that type-k consumers are better o↵ choosing the contract (qk, xk) rather
than the contract designed for type l 6= k.
Contracts which o↵er negative utility to consumers would never be selected. It is therefore
without loss of generality to assume that menus are individually rational (IR), i.e. u(qk, xk, ✓k)   0
for each k. According to our convention, a firm that does not want to serve type k o↵ers an incentive
compatible menu with type-k contract (qk, xk) = (0, 0). A menu M that satisfies the IC and IR
constraints is said to be implementable. The set of implementable menus is denoted by I.
One key feature of our analysis is that there is heterogeneity in the information possessed by
consumers about the menus o↵ered by firms. To simplify the exposition, we model this heterogeneity
in the baseline model according to the simultaneous-search framework of Burdett and Judd (1983).
Each consumer observes the menus of a sample of firms independently and uniformly drawn from the
set of all firms. For each consumer, the size of the observed sample is j 2 {1, 2, . . .} with probability
!j(v). Consumers select the best contract among all menus in their samples.
The distribution over sample sizes ⌦(v) ⌘ {!j(v) : j = 1, 2, . . .} is indexed by the degree of
competition v 2 R+.13 We assume that, as v increases, the distribution ⌦(v) increases in the
likelihood-ratio order, capturing the idea that consumers are more likely to observe larger samples
of firms.14 The interpretation is that v represents the level of informational frictions in the market.
In Section 5 below we describe other matching technologies, yielding alternative interpretations. For
instance, in its Example 1 the ratio of firms to consumers plays a similar role to that of v.
We also assume that !1(v) 2 (0, 1) whenever v > 0; this rules out the possibility that all firms
are local monopolists, but ensures all firms have some market power (their o↵ers are the only o↵er
received with positive probability). To span the entire spectrum of competitive intensity, we assume
that !1(0) = 1 (i.e., firms are local monopolies when the degree of competition is minimal), and
sumer can contract with at most one firm. The di culties associated with stochastic mechanisms in environments
where consumers can try firms sequentially (e.g., a consumer might look for a second firm if the lottery o↵ered by the
first firm resulted in a bad outcome) are discussed in Rochet and Stole (2002).
12Assume a seller o↵ers a menu with more than two price-quality pairs and that at least one type chooses two or
more options with positive probability. It is easy to show that there is a menu, with a single option intended for each
consumer type, which yields the same payo↵ to each type but strictly increases the seller’s profit (see Lemma 1 below).
13For every v, we assume that ⌦(v) has a finite mean.
14The likelihood-ratio order is commonly used in economics (see Jewitt (1991) for a detailed account). For discrete
random variables, we say that X dominates Xˆ in the sense of the likelihood-ratio order if ⇢(x)⇢ˆ(x) is increasing in x over
the union of the supports of X and Xˆ, where ⇢ and ⇢ˆ are the probability mass functions of X and Xˆ.
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limv!1 !1(v) = 0 (i.e., consumers are sure to know at least two firms as the degree of competition
grows unbounded). For a simple example satisfying these requirements, let ⌦(v) be a shifted Poisson
distribution with support on {1, 2, . . .} and mean v + 1.
It is convenient to denote by F˜ the probability measure over menus prevailing in the economy.
In intuitive terms, this measure describes the cross-section distribution of menus o↵ered by all firms.
This measure, which has support S contained in the set of implementable menus I, induces, for each
type k, the marginal distribution over indirect utilities
Fk(u˜k) ⌘ ProbF˜ [M : u(qk, xk, ✓k)  u˜k] .
We denote by ⌥k ✓ R+ the support of indirect utilities o↵ered to type-k consumers, and by fk the
density of Fk, whenever it exists.
A firm’s expected sales to type-k consumers will depend on the ranking of the indirect utility
that the firm’s o↵er yields to type-k consumers (relative to other o↵ers in the market).15 If the
type-k contract is (qk, xk), then this ranking is yk = Fk(u(qk, xk, ✓k)). We define the sales function
⇤ (yk|v) such that, if the distribution Fk is continuous, then each firm expects sales pk⇤ (yk|v) to
consumers of type k. In our baseline model (following Burdett and Judd (1983)), we have that
⇤ (yk|v) =
1X
j=1
j!j(v)y
j 1
k (1)
for any type-k contract with rank yk.16 In the case where the sample-size distribution ⌦(v) is a
shifted-Poisson, the sales function simplifies to ⇤ (yk|v) = (1 + vyk) exp{ v(1   yk)}. In Section 5
we describe the sales functions induced by other models of information heterogeneity.
A firm that faces a measure over menus F˜ (inducing the marginal cdf Fk over type-k indirect
utilities) chooses a menu ((ql, xl); (qh, xh)) 2 I to maximize profitsX
k=l,h
pk⇤ (Fk(u(qk, xk, ✓k))|v) (xk   '(qk)) . (2)
The next definition formalizes our notion of equilibrium in terms of the probability measure over
menus F˜ .
15A firm’s sales to type k consumers depends neither on the o↵ers it makes to other consumer types l 6= k, nor on
the distribution over contracts o↵ered to other types by competing firms. This is an immediate consequence of the fact
that all menus are incentive compatible.
16At any point where Fk has an atom, sales are determined according to a uniform rationing rule (which amounts to
assuming that consumers evenly randomize across o↵ers generating the same payo↵s). Formally, if uk 2 ⌥k is a mass
point of Fk, then the share of sales to type-k agents obtained by a firm o↵ering indirect utility uk is✓
Fk(uk)  lim
u˜k"uk
Fk(u˜k)
◆ 1
·
ˆ Fk(uk)
limu˜k"uk Fk(u˜k)
⇤ (y|v) dy.
Finally, this share equals ⇤ (1|v) if uk > u˜k for all u˜k 2 ⌥k, and equals ⇤ (0|v) if 0  uk < u˜k for all u˜k 2 ⌥k.
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Definition 1 [Equilibrium] An equilibrium is a probability measure over menus F˜ (inducing the
marginal cdf Fk over type-k indirect utilities) such that M 2 supp F˜ ⇢ I implies that M maximizes
profits (2).
Accordingly, an equilibrium is described by a probability distribution over menus such that every
menu in the support maximizes firms’ profits. This equilibrium definition renders itself to di↵erent
interpretations. For instance, one interpretation is that firms follow symmetric mixed strategies by
randomizing over menus according to the probability F˜ . Another interpretation is that each firm
follows a pure strategy that consists in posting some menu in the support of F˜ .
2.1 Incentive Compatibility and Indirect Utilities
A key step in our analysis is to formulate the firms’ maximization problem in terms of the of indirect
utilities o↵ered to consumers. To this end, denote by
q⇤k ⌘ argmaxq ✓k · q   '(q),
the e cient quality for type-k consumers, and let S⇤k ⌘ ✓k ·q⇤k '(q⇤k) be the social surplus associated
with the e cient quality provision. The next lemma uses the incentive constraints and the optimality
of equilibrium contracts to map indirect utilities into quality levels.
Lemma 1 [Incentive Compatibility] Consider a menu M = {(ql, xl) , (qh, xh)} in the support of
the equilibrium probability over menus, F˜ , and let uk ⌘ u(qk, xk, ✓k). Then, for all k 2 {l, h},
qk (ul, uh) = 1k(uh   ul) · uh   ul4✓ + (1  1k(uh   ul)) · q
⇤
k, (3)
where 1h(z) is an indicator function that equals one if and only if z > q⇤h · 4✓, and 1l(z) is an
indicator function that equals one if and only if z < q⇤l ·4✓.
The result above is standard in adverse selection models. Consider some menu M 2 supp (F˜ )
o↵ered in equilibrium, and let (ul, uh) be its profile of indirect utilities. Suppose for illustration
that uh   ul < q⇤h ·4✓ (this turns out to always be the case in equilibrium). Then 1h(uh   ul) = 0,
and so qh = q⇤h (i.e., we have e ciency at the top). This simply reflects that the low-type incentive
constraint (ICl) is always slack. The low-type quality is then e cient if uh   ul +  ✓ · q⇤l , and
downward distorted otherwise. This is simply because the high-type incentive constraint (ICh) is
slack in the former case, and binds otherwise.
In light of Lemma 1, we can describe each menu in the support of F˜ in terms of the indirect
utilities (ul, uh) induced by M. Given (ul, uh), one can determine via (3) the equilibrium quality
levels consumed by each consumer type (ql, qh), and hence also the prices paid (xl, xh).
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Two natural benchmarks play an important role in the analysis that follows. The first one is the
static monopolistic (or Mussa-Rosen) solution. Under this benchmark, the quality provided to low
types, denote it qml , is implicitly defined by:
'0(qml ) = max
⇢
✓l   phpl · ✓, 0
 
. (4)
We interpret qml = 0 as meaning that low-type consumers are not served under the monopolistic
solution. In turn, quality provision for high types is e cient: qmh = q
⇤
h. Finally, recall that, in the
monopolistic solution, the indirect utility left to low types is zero, uml = 0 (as the IR constraint
is binding), and the indirect utility left to high types is umh = q
m
l · 4✓, as the constraint ICh is
binding. Written in terms of indirect utilities, the menu Mm ⌘ (0, qml ·4✓) is the monopolist (or
Mussa-Rosen) menu.
The second benchmark is the competitive (or Bertrand) solution. Under this benchmark, quality
provision to both types is e cient and firms derive zero profits from each contract in the menu.
Written in terms of indirect utilities, the menu M⇤ ⌘ (S⇤l , S⇤h) is the competitive (or Bertrand)
menu. We can now proceed to characterizing the equilibrium of our model.
3 Equilibrium Characterization
We start by studying the firms’ profit-maximization problem, and then characterize equilibrium. For
analytical convenience, the analysis of this section is developed in the space of indirect utilities. The
next section then translates the equilibrium characterization into properties of observable variables.
3.1 Firm Problem
For each menu M = (ul, uh) o↵ered in equilibrium, let
Sk(ul, uh) ⌘ ✓k · qk(ul, uh)  '(qk(ul, uh)) (5)
be the social surplus induced by M for each type-k consumer, where the quality levels qk(ul, uh) are
computed according to (3). We can then write the profit per sale to type-k consumers produced by
the menu M = (ul, uh) as Sk(ul, uh)  uk.
Employing Lemma 1, we can rewrite the firm’s profit-maximization problem (in response to the
cdf’s over indirect utilities Fl, Fh) as that of choosing a menu (ul, uh) to maximize
⇡(ul, uh) ⌘
X
k=l,h
pk⇤ (Fk(uk)|v) (Sk(ul, uh)  uk) , (6)
subject to the constraint uh   ul   0. This constraint guarantees that menus are individually
rational. The requirement that uh   ul captures incentive compatibility, as it guarantees that the
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indirect utility profile (ul, uh) can be generated by a pair of contracts satisfying the self-selection
constraint of each consumer type.
It is worth comparing Equation (6) to the profit expressions that appear in the literature assum-
ing horizontal di↵erentiation (where consumers have preferences over brands); see, especially, Rochet
and Stole (2002). The only di↵erence is in how expected sales are determined. In our setting, be-
cause consumers are only concerned with the utility of consumption net of transfers (and thus pick
the best o↵er available), expected sales to each type k depend on the rank Fk(uk) of the indirect
utility o↵ered by the firm (as described by the sales function ⇤). By contrast, in Rochet and Stole
(2002), sales depend on how di↵erences in anticipated indirect utilities compare with di↵erences in
transportation costs (which describe horizontal preferences).
To better understand the firms’ trade-o↵s, we now analyze the first-order conditions for (6). We
will follow the common practice in mechanism design of assuming that ICl is slack in equilibrium,
in which case ICh is the only constraint that may bind in equilibrium. We also assume that each Fk
is di↵erentiable; in the appendix, we verify that these properties hold in all equilibria. First-order
conditions for each firm’s problem are then
ph · ⇤1 (Fh(uh)|v) · fh(uh) · (S⇤h   uh)| {z }
sales gains
  ph · ⇤ (Fh(uh)|v)| {z }
profit losses
+ pl · ⇤ (Fl(ul)|v) · @Sl@uh (ul, uh)| {z }
e ciency gains
= 0 (7)
for uh, and
pl · ⇤1 (Fl(ul)|v) · fl(ul) · (Sl(ul, uh)  ul)| {z }
sales gains
  pl · ⇤ (Fl(ul)|v)| {z }
profit losses
+ pl · ⇤ (Fl(ul)|v) · @Sl@ul (ul, uh)| {z }
e ciency losses
= 0 (8)
for ul. Intuitively, the firms’ choice of menus balances sales, profit, and e ciency considerations.
Let us start with the first-order condition for high-type payo↵s, given by Equation (7). The first
two terms in (7) are familiar from models without asymmetric information on type. By increasing
the indirect utility uh, the firm makes its menu more attractive to high types, increasing sales (the
first term). However, the higher indirect utility reduces profits per sale to high types (the second
term). The third term captures the e↵ect of an increase in uh on the quality o↵ered to low-type
consumers. When ICh is slack (i.e., uh > ul + ✓ · q⇤l ), high types have no incentive to imitate low
types, and this term is zero. When ICh binds (in which case uh = ul+ ✓ ·ql), increasing uh increases
the quality ql that can be supplied to the low type, while holding ul fixed. Hence,
@ql(ul, uh)
@uh
=
1
 ✓
.
The marginal e↵ect of increasing low-type quality on surplus per sale is ✓l '0(ql), and so the marginal
e↵ect of an increase in uh is
@Sl
@uh
(ul, uh) =
1
 ✓
 
✓l   '0(ql)
 
.
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Holding ul fixed, the seller appropriates all of the additional surplus, and this is reflected in profits.
On the other hand, when ICh is slack, increasing uh does not a↵ect the quality supplied to the low
type (which is equal to the e cient level), and so the e ciency e↵ect on profits is absent.
The first-order condition for low-type utilities is given by Equation (8). The first two terms
are familiar from (7). In contrast to (7), however, increasing ul has the e↵ect of tightening ICh, so
the quality distortion present in the low-types’ contract increases. The e ciency loss is the third
term in Equation (8). It has the same magnitude as the third term in (7), but the opposite sign.
Our equilibrium analysis of the next subsections will clarify how firms simultaneously resolve the
e ciency-rent-extraction and the rent-extraction-sales-volume trade-o↵s in equilibrium.
Equations (7) and (8) capture the role of consumers’ private information on preferences in
determining the firms’ choice of menus. For instance, they show how the optimal design of contracts
for low and high types are linked as a result of (high-type) incentive constraints. To see this, suppose
that instead types are public and contractual o↵ers can be conditioned directly on each consumer’s
type. Then we would have Sl(ul, uh) = S⇤l , and the third terms in (7) and (8) would be zero. Instead,
when consumer types are private information, the problems of choosing ul and uh are interdependent
whenever incentive constraints bind. As the next lemma shows, this interdependency is materialized
in the following crucial property of the expected profit function ⇡.
Lemma 2 [Increasing di↵erences] Consider any two implementable menus (u1l , u
1
h) and (u
2
l , u
2
h),
with u2l > u
1
l and u
2
h > u
1
h. Then we have
⇡
 
u2l , u
2
h
   ⇡  u2l , u1h    ⇡  u1l , u2h   ⇡  u1l , u1h  . (9)
If some incentive constraint binds for at least one of these menus (i.e., uih   uil /2 [q⇤l ·4✓, q⇤h ·4✓]
for some i 2 {1, 2}), then the inequality in (9) is strict. Otherwise, (9) holds with equality.
Intuitively, the result above means that firms generating a high uh have a comparative advantage
in generating a high ul. To understand why this is true, let us consider the first-order conditions (7)
and (8) and suppose that ICh is binding for both menus (i.e., uih   uil <  ✓q⇤l for i 2 {1, 2}).17 In
this case, ql =
uh ul4✓ , and increasing uh from u
1
h to u
2
h raises the quality supplied to the low type.
This increases the marginal profit of raising ul for two reasons. First, the sales gains from raising
ul (which is the first term in (8)) go up as uh increases. Second, the e ciency losses from raising
ul (which is the third term in (8)) go down (in absolute value) as uh increases. This is so because
the cost of quality ' is convex, which means that a marginal reduction in low-type quality has less
e↵ect on surplus when this quality is closer to its first-best level. These e↵ects are summarized by
17The intuition for the case where the low types’ incentive constraint binds is similar. However, we will show that
this constraint does not bind in equilibrium.
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the cross derivative of the profit function ⇡ at any menu for which ICh is binding:
@2⇡(ul, uh)
@uh@ul
= pl · fl(ul) · ⇤1 (Fl(ul)|v)
✓
✓l   '0(ql)
 ✓
◆
+
pl · ⇤ (Fl(ul)|v) · '00(ql)
( ✓)2
> 0, (10)
as can be directly computed from either (7) or (8).18 The first term captures the e↵ect of uh on the
sales gain from raising ul, while the second term captures the e↵ect of uh on the e ciency loss from
raising ul. Both terms are positive.
In contrast, if no incentive constraints bind at some menu (ul, uh), the profit function ⇡ exhibits
constant di↵erences; i.e., @
2⇡(ul,uh)
@uh@ul
= 0. In this case, as established by Lemma 1, optimality requires
that qualities are fixed at their e cient levels for both consumer types, and the e↵ects of ul and uh
on profits are locally separable.
Before characterizing the equilibrium, we will use Lemma 2 to establish that, in any equilibrium,
the distributions over indirect utilities, Fl and Fh, are absolutely continuous, and have support on
an interval that starts at the indirect utility associated with the monopolistic (Mussa-Rosen) menu.
Lemma 3 [Support] In any equilibrium of this economy, the marginal cdf over indirect utilities for
type k 2 {l, h}, Fk, is absolutely continuous. Its support is ⌥k = [umk , u¯k], where u¯k < S⇤k.
The lemma above has a number of important implications. First, because the distributions Fk
are absolutely continuous, no equilibria exist in which a positive mass of firms post the same menu.
Second, the minimum indirect utilities o↵ered in equilibrium are those induced by the monopoly
menu. The proof, contained in the appendix, combines familiar arguments from models of price
dispersion under complete information (e.g., Varian (1980)) with novel ones that account for incentive
constraints.
3.2 Ordered Equilibrium
We construct an equilibrium in which firms that cede high indirect utilities to high types also cede
high indirect utilities low types. We say that equilibria that satisfy this property are ordered.
Definition 2 [Ordered Equilibrium] An equilibrium is said to be ordered if, for any two menus
M = (ul, uh) and M0 = (u0l, u0h) o↵ered in equilibrium, ul < u0l if and only if uh < u0h. In this case,
the menu (u0l, u
0
h) is said to be more generous than the menu (ul, uh).
Note that menus o↵ered in an ordered equilibrium can be described via a support function
relating high-type payo↵s to the low-type payo↵s in any menu.
Remark 1 [Support Function] In every ordered equilibrium, the support of indirect utilities o↵ered
by firms can be described by a strictly increasing and bijective support function uˆl : ⌥h ! ⌥l such
that, for every menu M = (ul, uh) in ⌥l ⇥⌥h, ul = uˆl(uh).
18Di↵erentiability of Fl holds in equilibrium, but is not assumed in the proof of Lemma 2.
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Theorem 1 characterizes the unique ordered equilibrium of the economy. We find it notationally
convenient to denote the identity function by uˆh (uh) = uh for all uh 2 ⌥h.
Theorem 1 [Equilibrium Characterization] There exists a unique ordered equilibrium. In this
equilibrium, the support of indirect utilities o↵ered by firms is described by the support function
uˆl : [umh , u¯h]! [0, u¯l] that is the unique solution to the di↵erential equation
uˆ0l(uh) =
Sl(uˆl(uh), uh)  uˆl(uh)
S⇤h   uh
· 1 
pl
ph
· @Sl@uh (uˆl(uh), uh)
1  @Sl@ul (uˆl(uh), uh)
(11)
with boundary condition uˆl(umh ) = 0.
The equilibrium distribution over menus solves
⇤ (Fh(uh)|v)
⇤ (0|v) =
P
k=l,h pk · (Sk(0, umh )  umk )P
k=l,h pk · (Sk(uˆl(uh), uh)  uˆk(uh))
, (12)
and the supremum point u¯h is determined by Fh(u¯h) = 1.
The existence of an ordered equilibrium is intimately related to the increasing di↵erences property
of firms’ profit functions established in Lemma 2. To understand how, consider a firm that raises the
indirect utility of high types uh (or, equivalently, reduces the price charged to high types xh). As
noted above, this relaxes ICh (i.e., it relaxes the constraint uh   ul+ ✓ · ql), permitting an increase
in the quality supplied to low types ql without a violation of incentive compatibility. If ul were to
remain fixed, then the firm would extract all of the additional surplus associated with the increase
in ql. But since the firm now makes more profits per sale to low types, it is worthwhile sharing some
of the surplus with low types in order to make more of these sales. This explains why uh and ul
increase together in equilibrium.
As noted in Remark 1, the support function uˆl(·) is thus strictly increasing. This function,
together with the supremum point u¯h, determines the set of menus o↵ered in equilibrium; i.e., the
support of the equilibrium distribution F˜ . Completing the characterization of F˜ , Equation (12)
determines the marginal distribution over high-type payo↵s Fh. Note that this equation is simply an
indi↵erence condition which requires that all menus in the support of F˜ generate the same expected
profits (more generous menus, i.e., those with a higher uh, make more sales in expectation, but
smaller expected profits per sale).
A striking feature of equilibrium is that the support function uˆl (·) does not depend on the sales
function ⇤. This means that uˆl (·) is invariant to the sample-size distribution ⌦(v), and hence to
any variation in the level of competition, v. By contrast, the support of equilibrium menus does
depend on ⌦(v), but only through the supremum indirect utility u¯h, determined by the indi↵erence
condition (12). ⌦(v) also plays an important role in determining the equilibrium distribution over
menus, as seen from (12).
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The slope of the support function, implicitly determined by the di↵erential equation (11), de-
scribes how the intensity of competition varies across types. A slope uˆ0l(uh) close to zero means that
firms are willing to cede very little indirect utility to low types as they o↵er one extra unit of indirect
utility to high types. By contrast, as the slope uˆ0l(uh) approaches unity, competition for the two types
becomes “more balanced”. Accordingly, the lower is the slope uˆ0l(uh), the fiercer is the competition
for high types (relative to low types) among the firms that o↵er menus close to (uˆl(uh), uh). The
next lemma describes how the slope uˆ0l(·) varies across equilibrium menus.
Corollary 1 [Competition Across Types] The equilibrium support function is such that 0 <
uˆ0l(uh) < 1 for all uh 2 (umh , u¯h). Moreover, the slope uˆ0l(·) is increasing in uh (i.e., uˆl(·) is convex)
and satisfies uˆ0l (u
m
h ) = 0.
Corollary 1 states that the slope uˆ0l(uh) is always less than unity; this means that competition
for high types is fiercer than for low types at all menus o↵ered in equilibrium. There are two
reasons for this. First, purchases by high-type consumers generate more profits per sale than for
low types, reflecting the fact that high-type consumers have more surplus to share with firms (i.e.,
S⇤h > Sl(uˆl(uh), uh)). Second, as noted above, increasing the high-type payo↵ relaxes the high-type
incentive constraint ICh; when this constraint is binding, it permits higher quality to be supplied to
low types in an incentive-compatible manner.
The slope of the support function determines how low-type quality varies across menus. In
particular, recall that
ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) =
uh   uˆl (uh)
 ✓
whenever uh   uˆl (uh)  4✓ · q⇤l (i.e., when ICh binds). Because uˆ0l(uh) < 1, the quality provided to
low types is strictly increasing in uh (and so is the low-type surplus Sl(uˆl(uh), uh)). It then follows
that there is a threshold level of uh, call it uch, above which low-type quality is e cient. The threshold
uch is the the unique value of uh solving uh   uˆl (uh) = 4✓ · q⇤l .
The corollary above also establishes that the slope uˆ0l(·) is increasing in uh. The reason is that
low-type quality increases with uh, which implies that sales to low types become more profitable the
more generous is the firm. This results in more generous firms competing more fiercely for low types
(relative to high types).19
The last property established by Corollary 1 is that the slope of the support function is zero in
a neighborhood of the Mussa-Rosen menu. To gain intuition, suppose that umh > 0. For menus in
a neighborhood of the monopoly menu (0, umh ), increasing uh has only a second-order e↵ect on the
profitability of a sale, since umh is an interior maximizer of these profits. Increasing ul, however,
19There is also a second reason why competition becomes more balanced as uh increases. Because the marginal
surplus created by additional low-type quality is smaller the more e cient is quality provision, firms gain less by
raising uh (through the relaxation of ICh) the higher is uh.
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Figure 1: The equilibrium support function uˆl(·). The dotted line is the 45-degree line.
leads to a first-order loss in profits per sale. As such, competing for high types is arbitrarily less
costly than competing for low types for firms o↵ering a menu close to the monopolistic one. This
implies uˆ0l (u
m
h ) = 0 in equilibrium.
Figure 1 illustrates these observations. This figure represents the entire graph of the support
function, {(uˆl (uh) , uh) : uh 2 [umh , S⇤h)}. Which of these o↵ers are made in equilibrium depends on
the supremum point u¯h.
Before developing some testable implications of our model, it is useful to understand how the
degree of competition in the market a↵ects the equilibrium distribution over menus. To this end,
consider the indi↵erence condition (12) from Proposition 1. Its right-hand side is independent of the
degree of competition v (similarly to the support function), while its left-hand side increases with
v.20 It then follows that, as the degree of competition increases, (i) firms become more likely to o↵er
more generous menus, and (ii) the support of equilibrium menus expands. To see the latter, note
that expected profits fall as competition increases. Hence, the firm which makes the largest number
of expected sales, by o↵ering the most generous menu (uˆl (u¯h) , u¯h), must be yielding more rent to
consumers in equilibrium (i.e., u¯h must increase with competition).
To formalize these results, and to state the key empirical predictions of our theory in the next
section, we shall say that a random variable increases probabilistically if its distribution increases in
the sense of first-order stochastic dominance.
Corollary 2 [Comparative Statics] The indirect utility uk obtained by each consumer type k 2
{l, h} increases probabilistically with competition (i.e., as v increases). Moreover, the top of the
support of these indirect utilities u¯k increases with v.
20This follows from the fact that ⇤(y|v)⇤(0|v) increases with v for all y 2 (0, 1], as implied by Equation (1) and that ⌦(v)
increases in the likelihood-ratio order with v.
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The next remark clarifies when the ordered equilibrium is unique in the class of all possible
equilibria.
Remark 2 [Equilibrium Uniqueness] In deriving testable predictions below, we focus on the
unique ordered equilibrium characterized in Theorem 1. As we show in Appendix B, little (if anything)
is lost by restricting attention to this equilibrium. Namely, when the degree of competition is not too
large, the ordered equilibrium is the unique equilibrium. By contrast, if the degree of competition is
su ciently large, there are equilibria which are not ordered. However, all equilibria (including the
non-ordered ones) lead to the same marginal distributions over indirect utilities Fk(·), and the same
ex-ante profits for firms.
4 Economic Implications
For analytical convenience, the equilibrium characterization of the previous section was developed
in the space of indirect utilities. In this section, we employ this characterization to derive testable
implications in terms of prices, qualities and markups. We then relate these implications to the
available empirical evidence.
4.1 Competing on price and quality
Purchasing decisions depend on consumer preferences as well as on price and quality di↵erentials
across products. Absent asymmetric information about consumer preferences, all firms would o↵er
the same e cient quality level to each consumer type, although di↵erent prices. Under asymmetric
information, a firm’s choice of how much utility to leave to high types a↵ects its ability to provide
quality to low types (as the high-type incentive constraint, ICh, must be satisfied). As a conse-
quence, firms’ o↵ers to low types di↵er on both price and quality provision, which work as substitute
instruments for increasing sales.
Our theory helps to explain how firms select either one of these instruments as a function of the
degree of competition in the market. To explore this important question, it is convenient to write
the prices of the low and high quality goods as a function of indirect utilities:
xl (uh) ⌘ ✓l · ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh) , and
xh (uh) ⌘ ✓h · q⇤h   uh
for uh 2 ⌥h. The next result is then a consequence of Corollary 1. To state it, recall that umh is the
high-type indirect utility at the monopolistic menu, and that uch solves uh   uˆl (uh) = 4✓ · q⇤l .
Corollary 3 [Equilibrium Prices] The price of the high-quality good xh (uh) is strictly decreasing
in uh over [umh , S
⇤
h). There exists u
d
h 2 (umh , uch] such that the price of the low-quality good xl (uh) is
strictly increasing in uh if uh  udh, and strictly decreasing over
 
udh, S
⇤
h
 
.
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Figure 2: The low-type quality schedule (full curve and left-side Y-axis)) and the low-type price
(dotted curve and right-side Y-axis) as a function of the generosity of the menu, uh.
As established in Corollary 1, firms that o↵er menus close to the Mussa-Rosen one compete much
more fiercely for high than for low types, as implied by uˆ0l (u
m
h ) = 0. This results in the relaxation
of the high-type incentive constraint ICh, leading to an increase in the quality of the low-type good
relative to the Mussa-Rosen menu. Also because uˆ0l (u
m
h ) = 0, most of the additional surplus from
higher low-type quality is appropriated by the firms. This implies that prices have to increase.
Hence, firms o↵ering the least generous menus (i.e., uh < udh) compete for additional consumers by
increasing both the quality and the price of the low-quality option.
As the generosity of menus increases, firms compete more evenly for both consumer types, as they
are willing to cede relatively more utility to the low type (reflecting the fact that uˆl(·) is convex).
This implies that quality increases with generosity at a decreasing rate. If udh < u
c
h, then xl (·)
decreases with uh over the interval
 
udh, u
c
h
 
, although the low-type quality ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) increases
in uh. For still more generous menus, namely those with uh > uch, the low-type quality remains
constant at its e cient level. As a result, the price of the low-quality good necessarily decreases
in uh. Taken together, these observations imply the price of the low-quality good is a \-shaped
function of the menu generosity, as indexed by uh.
Finally, because high-type quality is e ciently provided for all levels of uh, the price of the
high-quality good xh (uh) strictly decreases in uh. Figure 2 summarizes the findings of Corollary 3.
Combined with the comparative statics of Corollary 2, Corollary 3 leads to interesting predictions
on how prices react to changes in the degree of competition in the market.
Proposition 1 [Price-Increasing Competition] As the degree of competition increases, the prices
for the high-quality good decrease and the quality levels of the low-quality good increase probabilisti-
cally. Moreover, there exists vd > 0 such that, if the degree of competition is low (i.e., v < vd), the
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prices for the low-quality good increase probabilistically as v increases to vˆ < vd.
Intuitively, more competition makes it more likely that firms o↵er high indirect utility to high
types while competing less aggressively for low types. As incentive constraints are relaxed, low-type
qualities increase (probabilistically), and so do low-type prices. Figure 2 nicely illustrates this result.
Consider first the case where v < vd. Because more competition shifts to the right the distribution
of high-type indirect utilities uh, and low-type prices increase in uh, it follows that low-type prices
have to increase (probabilistically) following an increase in v.
By contrast, when v > vd, the e↵ect of additional competition on the price of the low-quality
good depends on features of the market, such as the level of competition and the proportion of high
types. It is helpful to consider the limiting cases of monopoly and perfect competition (equivalently,
to consider the limits v ! 0 and v ! +1 in our model). For instance, suppose that the proportion
of high types, ph, is small. Then, as we go from monopoly to perfect competition, the price of the
low-quality good falls. This is because the low-type quality at the monopoly menu, qml , is close to the
e cient level q⇤l . Hence, while quality increases little in response to competition, the low type’s rent
goes from zero under monopoly to the entire surplus S⇤l at the competitive outcome. Conversely, if
ph is su ciently large, then the change in the low type’s quality is large, and the price paid by the
low type increases as we move from monopoly to perfect competition.
Our finding that increased competition can raise prices is not without empirical counterparts.
For instance, Chu (2010) finds that cable companies in the US reacted to new competition by
satellite television by raising both price and quality (as determined by the available channels) in
some markets, with consumers benefiting overall from the higher-priced o↵erings.21 Miravete and
Roller (2004) examine the market for cell-phone plans in the 1980s and find that, while prices per
minute for high-consumption users are lower in markets with competition, there is (approximately)
no di↵erence in prices for low-consumption users. Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) study the 90th and
10th percentiles of the distribution of airlines’ prices on given routes (as noted in the Introduction,
that airlines o↵er di↵erent prices on the same route can be substantially accounted for by variation
in tickets’ conditions). On so-called “big-city” routes, they find the 10th percentile of prices fall on
average less than half as much as the 90th percentile of prices with increases in competition. The
muted relationship between competition and the prices charged to low-paying consumers in Miravete
and Roller and Gerardi and Shapiro seems consistent with the findings in Proposition 1.22
The empirical literature also suggests a further prediction of our model; namely, that the di↵er-
ence between firms’ highest prices (xh (uh)) and lowest prices (xl (uh)) should decrease with compe-
21See also Byrne (2014), who uses Canadian data to study how the entry of satellite television a↵ected the pricing
and quality provision of cable television in Canada. His results are comparable to those of Chu (2010).
22Although data on quality provision is scarce, some papers support the prediction that baseline quality increases
with competition. Besides the work by Chu cited above, Mazzeo (2003) provide some direct evidence suggesting quality
increases in response to competition.
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tition. To see why, we can decompose the di↵erence in prices into di↵erences in consumption utility
and di↵erences in payo↵s of the consumers purchasing high- and low-quality options. In particular,
we can write the price di↵erential for a menu with high-type utility uh as
 p (uh) ⌘ xh (uh)  xl (uh)
= (✓h · q⇤h   ✓l · ql (uˆl (uh) , uh))| {z }
Di↵erence in consumption utility
  (uh   uˆl (uh))| {z }
Di↵erence in rents
. (13)
Recall that both the low-type quality ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) and the payo↵ di↵erential uh   uˆl (uh) are
increasing in uh. Together with Corollary 2 this implies the following result.
Proposition 2 [Competition and Price Di↵erentials] As the degree of competition increases,
the price di↵erential  p (uh) decreases probabilistically.
The logic behind this result is familiar from Proposition 1. High-quality prices always decrease
with more competition. On the other hand, the price of the low-quality good either (i) increases
(when competition is originally low, following large quality improvements), or (ii) decreases less
sharply (when competition is originally high, following small or null quality improvements). The
former reflects that quality improvements are a superior way (in terms of profits) to compete for
consumers than price reductions.
Much of the existing evidence on the role of competition in markets with price discrimination is
in line with this prediction.23 The studies of Miravete and Roller (2004) and Gerardi and Shapiro
(2009) mentioned above are clear examples. Another is Busse and Rysman (2005), who find that,
while prices for yellow-pages advertisements are lower on average in more competitive markets, this
price reduction is most pronounced for the largest (and hence most expensive) ads.
4.2 Distributional E↵ects of Competition
Our theory also generates predictions concerning the welfare of di↵erent consumer types, and the
profitability of sales to di↵erent types. Competition in our model is beneficial for both consumer types
(even when the price of the low-type option increases with competition), as implied by Corollary 2.
How the di↵erent types fare in relative terms can then be understood by studying
 u ⌘
ˆ
⌥h
uhdFh  
ˆ
⌥l
uldFl,
which is the di↵erence (in expectation) of the indirect utility o↵ered by firms to high and low types
in equilibrium. Corollaries 1 and 2 imply that  u increases with the degree of competition v.24 This
23For a recent review of this literature, see Crawford (2012).
24Note that  u =
´
⌥h
(uh   uˆl (uh)) dFh, after a change of variables. The result then follows, as uh   uˆl (uh) is
increasing in uh and Fh increases according to first-order stochastic dominance as v increases (by Corollaries 1 and 2).
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implies that, on average, an increase in competition leads to larger gains to high-type consumers.25
Again, this prediction is consistent with many of the studies that examine the e↵ects of com-
petition on consumer welfare in markets with price discrimination. Miravete and Roller (2004) and
Economides, Seim and Viard (2008) find that high-consumption users gain the most from increases
in competition in cellular phone markets. Chu (2010) finds that those consumers with the highest
value for quality in television packages gained most when satellite television began to compete with
incumbent cable providers. Other studies, such as Busse and Rysman (2005) and Gerardi and
Shapiro (2009) suggest that high-paying consumers have the most to gain from competition (due to
lower prices), but do not estimate consumer preferences.
These results also have a natural counterpart in the arena of incentive-based compensation.
Be´nabou and Tirole (2016) argue that the rise in incentive pay (often manifested in large bonus
payments) for bankers and CEOs can be naturally interpreted as a consequence of increasing compe-
tition for top talent. For instance, globalization has increased the geographical range of firms a given
manager or banker may consider working for (or have information about). The rise in incentive
pay has naturally benefited most those individuals with the greatest talent, capable of generating
the highest profits for their chosen firms. Our theory, which emphasizes agents’ heterogeneous in-
formation about available o↵ers, can be readily reframed to apply to these kinds of labor-market
settings, and would predict the observed distributional e↵ects of competition.26 See Section 6 for
more discussion on the labor-market application of our theory.
It is also interesting to compare how firms’ profits from the di↵erent types depend on the intensity
of competition. One natural way to do so is to consider the impact of competition on the markup
di↵erence, which is the di↵erence in profits per sale for high and low types. For a menu with
high-type utility uh, this can be written
 m (uh) ⌘ [xh (uh)  '(q⇤h)]  [xl (uh)  '(ql (uˆl (uh) , uh))]
= (S⇤h   Sl(uˆl(uh), uh))| {z }
Di↵erence in surplus
  (uh   uˆl (uh))| {z }
Di↵erence in rents
.
Recall that the low-type surplus Sl((uˆl (uh) , uh) is increasing in uh (because low-type quality is
increasing in uh), while the di↵erence in rents uh   uˆl (uh) is also increasing in uh. This, together
with our finding that uh increases probabilistically with competition (see Corollary 2), then implies
the following.
25The result in the text refers to the expected di↵erence in the utility o↵ered to each consumer type. It is straight-
forward to show the expected di↵erence in the utility accepted by di↵erent consumer types also increases in v.
26In the reframed model, high agent types would correspond to those individuals with the greatest ability to generate
high profits for their chosen firms, and these types would gain the most from competition among firms for the same
reasons we have described above.
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Proposition 3 [Competition and Markups] As the degree of competition increases, the markup
di↵erence decreases probabilistically.
In other words, markups decrease faster for high types than for low types as competition inten-
sifies. Intuitively, this result reflects two facts. First, competition is the fiercest for high-types, and
takes the exclusive form of price reductions. Second, much (in many cases, all) of the gains that low
types obtain from more competition take the form of higher provision of quality, rather than lower
prices. This contributes to moderate the e↵ect of competition on low-type markups.
Although researchers often lack data on marginal costs, the empirical work examining the rela-
tionship between mark-ups and competition seems broadly in line with Proposition 3. Under as-
sumptions on the structure of yellow-pages advertising, Busse and Rysman (2005) find that decreases
in mark-ups associated with competition are greatest for the largest sizes of ads in yellow-pages phone
books. Miravete and Roller (2004) estimate price-cost margins using a structural model, and find
that marginal costs fall in response to competition (possibly due to improved e ciency in markets
with competition). They argue that competition favors high-end users more than low-end users, as
the markup di↵erence across calling plans typically decreases as competition intensifies.
4.3 Competition and Preference Heterogeneity
Consumer preference heterogeneity is another important determinant of how competition impacts
price and qualities. In this subsection, we describe how di↵erences in consumer preferences help to
explain variations in quality provision and pricing across markets.
The next proposition addresses the following question: For markets with the same degree of
competition, how does quality provision depend on the distribution of consumer preferences?
Proposition 4 [Quality Provision and Preference Heterogeneity] The quality levels of the
low-type good probabilistically increase as the share of consumers with low willingness to pay (pl)
increases.
This result combines the e↵ects of changes in pl on both the support function and the equilibrium
distributions over indirect utilities. Crucially, an increase in pl induces the support function to shift
downwards; equivalently, for each ul, the associated uh increases. This reflects the fact that, as the
mass of low-type consumers increases, the marginal gains from increasing uh due to the relaxation
of ICh go up. Therefore, as we move to markets with a greater fraction of low-type consumers, for
each uh, the low-type quality o↵ered by menus of generosity uh has to increase.
In addition, the distribution over high-type indirect utilities shifts to the right as pl increases. To
understand why, recall that markup di↵erences  m (uh) decrease in uh. This implies that, as pl goes
up, the profits of the most generous firms are the ones to decrease the least. Therefore, to sustain
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indi↵erence, firms have to be more likely in equilibrium to o↵er menus of high generosity. These two
e↵ects together guarantee that low-type qualities are higher (probabilistically) in markets with more
low-type consumers. We are unaware of empirical work documenting the correlation across markets
between consumer tastes for quality and the quality of the low-type good.
Inspired by the empirical literature, the next proposition explores two other predictions of our
model. First, for markets with the same degree of competition, how do price di↵erentials depend
on the distribution of consumer preferences? Second, in which markets should we expect a greater
impact of competition on price di↵erentials?
To answer these questions, it is convenient to denote by  ˜p (y) the price di↵erential of rank y,
that is,  ˜p (y) ⌘ xh (uh) xl (uh) such that y = Fh(uh). By tracking the price di↵erential provided by
firms in each quantile of the distribution of indirect utilities, we are able to describe in a transparent
way the interplay between pricing and consumer heterogeneity.
Proposition 5 [Price Di↵erentials and Preference Heterogeneity] For any y 2 (0, 1), the
price di↵erential of rank y,  ˜p (y), decreases in v and pl. Moreover, if the degree of competition is
su ciently high (i.e., whenever v > v¯ for some v¯), the marginal impact of v on  ˜p (y) (in absolute
terms) is decreasing in pl.
As established by the proposition above, the price di↵erential of rank y is decreasing in both
v and pl, for any y 2 (0, 1). That it decreases in v follows immediately from Proposition 2. That
 ˜p (y) decreases in pl follows from two facts. First, the low-type quality level of rank y (namely
qˆl (y) ⌘ ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) such that y = Fh(uh)) increases in pl, as implied by Proposition 4. Second,
the price di↵erential of rank y is a decreasing function of the low-type quality qˆl (y) (see Equation
(13)).
More interesting, perhaps, is that the impact of competition on price di↵erentials is stronger in
markets with fewer low-type consumers. As such, the degree of competition and the fraction of low
types work as substitutes for reducing price di↵erentials. To get intuition, recall from the discussion
following Proposition 4 that, as pl increases, the utility enjoyed by high-type consumers goes up
probabilistically, or, equivalently, high-type prices go down. Together with the fact that low-type
qualities are higher in markets with more low-type consumers (as established by Proposition 4), this
means that competition is fiercer for low types the higher is pl. This works to moderate the impact
of competition on price di↵erentials, as the surplus to be shared with consumers from low-type sales
is smaller.
In line with this prediction, Gerardi and Shapiro (2009) find that the compression of an airline’s
prices associated with increased competition is greatest on “big-city” routes, likely to have the
greatest number of high-paying business travelers.
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5 Extensions
5.1 Other Models of Information Heterogeneity
A key feature of our analysis is that consumers are heterogeneously informed about the o↵ers prevail-
ing in the market. To simplify the exposition, we modeled information heterogeneity following the
“simultaneous-search” framework proposed by Burdett and Judd (1983). Our results are, however,
robust to other matching technologies, as we now describe.
One notable example of a matching technology under which our results readily apply is the
“urn-ball” model of Butters (1977).
Example 1 [Butters (1977)] Let the menu o↵ered by each firm be observed at random by exactly
one consumer. The analysis of Butters (1977) implies that, when the number of firms and consumers
in the market is large (with ratio ⌘), the expected sales to type-k consumers of a firm o↵ering an
indirect utility of rank yk (relative to the other o↵ers in the market) is given by pk⇤ (yk|⌘), where the
sales function ⇤ (yk|⌘) has the form
⇤ (yk|⌘) = exp { ⌘(1  yk)} .
The parameter ⌘, describing the ratio of firms to consumers, plays an analogous role to the degree of
competition v in the Burdett-Judd specification of the baseline model.
Another important example is the “on-the-job search” model of Burdett and Mortensen (1998).
Example 2 [Burdett and Mortensen (1998)] Consider a dynamic economy in continuous time
in which consumers receive ads (each ad describes the menu of a particular firm) according to inde-
pendent Poisson processes with arrival rate  . Consumers must make purchasing decisions as soon as
an ad arrives, and there is no recall. Each matched consumer purchases continuously from the seller
until the match is dissolved. This can occur exogenously due to an event which arrives at Poisson
rate  . Alternatively, consumers may switch firms if they receive (at rate  ) an ad describing a more
attractive menu. The analysis of Burdett and Mortensen (1998) implies that, at the steady state of
this economy, the expected sales to type-k consumers of a firm o↵ering an indirect utility of rank yk
(relative to the other o↵ers in the market) is given by pk⇤ (yk| ), where the sales function ⇤ (yk| )
has the form
⇤ (yk| ) =  

1
  +  (1  yk)
  
1
  + r +  (1  yk)
 
.
The parameter  , describing the arrival rate of a new ad, plays an analogous role to the degree of
competition v in the Burdett-Judd specification of the baseline model.
The examples above share a number of features. First, the mass of sales is linear in the mass of
type-k consumers in the market. Second, sales functions depend on uk only through the rank in the
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distribution of indirect utilities to type k, Fk (uk). This “ranking property” reflects the assumption
that consumers are concerned only for the utility of consumption net of transfers (and thus pick the
best o↵er available based on these features), and not with other characteristics of a firm’s o↵er such
as transportation costs or the firm’s identity.
These two features, together with some other technical requirements detailed below, define a
class of matching technologies under which all results from Sections 3 and 4 hold as stated.
Assumption 1 Let F˜ be a measure over menus with supp F˜ ⇢ I, and marginal cdf over type-k
indirect utilities Fk, with support ⌥k. At any continuity point uk 2 ⌥k of Fk, the expected sales to
type-k consumers of a firm o↵ering an indirect utility of rank yk = Fk(uk) is given by pk⇤ (yk|v),
where the sales function ⇤ (y|v) is continuously di↵erentiable, bounded, strictly increasing in y with
derivative bounded away from zero, and is such that ⇤(y|v)⇤(0|v) is strictly increasing in v for any y > 0.
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This last requirement means that, relative to the least generous menu available in the market,
the proportional gains in sales from o↵ering a contract whose indirect utility lies in some quantile
y > 0 increases with the degree of competition v. The matching technologies of Burdett and Judd
(1983) and of the Examples 1 and 2 satisfy Assumption 1. We refer the reader to a previous version
of this article (Garrett et al (2014)) for other examples, as well as for a detailed proof of Theorem 1
that covers any matching technology satisfying Assumption 1.
5.2 Continuum of Types
The equilibrium characterization described above proceeded under the assumption of two consumer
types (with no restrictions on the probability distribution). In a previous version of this article
(Garrett et al (2014)), we extend our characterization to the case of a continuum of types with a
uniform distribution and quadratic costs. This extension exhibits the (arguably, realistic) feature
that qualities are distorted for almost every consumer type in every equilibrium menu. This is unlike
the binary model considered here, where quality is e ciently provided with positive probability (for
high types). Importantly, we show that our main insights remain true (pertaining to the existence of
an ordered equilibrium, and its implications for pricing and quality provision) in this continuum-type
setting.28
27At any point where Fk is discontinuous (i.e., has an atom), sales are determined according to uniform rationing
rule described in Footnote 14.
28The chief di culty for analyzing other specifications stems from the fact that closed-form solutions are di cult to
obtain. We have numerically calculated equilibria for the discrete-type case with various number of types and di↵erent
distributions over consumer types, obtaining results similar to those reported above.
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5.3 Information Acquisition by Consumers
In order to isolate the e↵ects of competition on the firms’ pricing and quality provision, the analysis
above assumed that consumer information is exogenous. In reality, information might often be
endogenous, as consumers may invest in information acquisition, so as to learn the o↵ers available
in the market.
It is possible to incorporate information acquisition by consumers in our model of competitive
nonlinear pricing. A natural alternative is to assume that, after learning their willingness to pay for
quality, each consumer can make an investment that shifts her sample-size distribution according
to first-order stochastic dominance. We explore this extension in a previous version of this article
(Garrett et al (2014)), and show that high-type consumers invest more in information acquisition than
low types. As a result, relative to the case where information is exogenous, consumer information
acquisition makes high types “over-represented” in equilibrium, i.e., firms behave as if high-type
consumers were more frequent relative to low types than as implied by their actual masses.
6 Conclusion
This paper studies imperfect competition in price-quality schedules in a market with informational
frictions. On the one hand, consumers have private information about their willingness to pay for
quality. On the other, consumers are imperfectly informed about the o↵ers in the market, which is
the source of firms’ market power. While firms are ex-ante identical, equilibrium menus are dispersed
and can be ranked in terms of their generosity to all consumer types. Our analysis illuminates how
firms of di↵erent generosity employ price reductions and/or quality improvements to compete for
consumers.
We build on the characterization of equilibrium to deliver a number of empirical implications
that explore changes in market fundamentals. Namely, (i) we study how prices and qualities react
to changes in competition, (ii) we analyze the distributional e↵ects of competition across consumer
types, and (iii) we assess the impact of variations in consumer tastes and competition on the price
di↵erentials within firms’ menus. These predictions find support in a number of markets, such as
those for cell phone plans, yellow-pages advertising, airline tickets and cable television.
Labor-Market Application. While we focused on sales of products with variable quality, our
results extend to other contexts where information heterogeneity makes sense. A natural application,
for instance, is to labor markets where workers have private information about their productivities,
and are heterogeneously informed about the job o↵ers available in the market. Contracts might pay
wages based on the worker’s output. In such settings, our results indicate dispersion over o↵ers, with
firms endogenously segmenting themselves relative to (i) the indirect utility left to all worker types,
and (ii) the e ciency of e↵ort provision induced by their contracts. We expect that changes in labor
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market fundamentals generate empirical predictions analogous to those derived above.
Directions for Further Research. For the sake of tractability, we have assumed that firms’
capacities are unconstrained, so they are able to fill all orders. Capacity constraints raise the possi-
bility that those firms o↵ering the most generous menus sell out, a possibility that consumers should
in turn anticipate. An examination of these “congestion e↵ects” when consumer tastes are private
information and information is heterogeneous seems di cult but worthwhile.29
A perhaps more tractable alternative to modeling capacity constraints is to assume that the
marginal benefit of an additional consumer is decreasing in the measure of consumers already served
by each firm. If firms are heterogeneous in costs, we conjecture that market segmentation would occur
in equilibrium, and more cost-e↵ective firms would serve on average higher-valuation consumers.
Finally, we assumed that consumers observe the entire menu of qualities o↵ered by each firm.
In practice, consumers may fail to consider all of the options that a firm o↵ers; i.e., information
imperfections may pertain also to a consumer’s ability to observe the entire menu. This possibility
has been explicitly recognized in empirical work (e.g., Sovinsky Goeree (2008)). In theoretical work,
Villas-Boas (2004) studies a monopolist whose consumers may (randomly) observe only the option
designed for the high or low type; extending the analysis to a competitive setting raises additional
challenges.
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7 Appendix A: Main Proofs
Throughout all the appendices, we find convenient to define
 k(u) ⌘ pk⇤ (Fk(u)|v) (14)
for k 2 {l, h} .
Proof of Lemma 1. If the low type is o↵ered the quality ql, then payo↵s must satisfy ICh, i.e.,
uh   ul + ✓ql. (15)
On the other hand, IC l requires that
ul   ul   ✓qh. (16)
The firm would like to make its o↵er as e cient as possible subject to the payo↵s it delivers to the
consumer.
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If uh ul <  ¯l ⌘  ✓q⇤l , then o↵ering the e cient quality q⇤l for the low type is inconsistent with
(15), and the firm does best to choose the highest possible value. That is, the firm chooses quality
ql (ul, uh) which satisfies (15) with equality, or
ql (ul, uh) ⌘ uh   ul ✓ .
If uh   ul    ¯l, then the constraint (15) does not bind, and the firm chooses low-type quality
e ciently: ql (ul, uh) ⌘ q⇤l . Similarly, let  ¯h ⌘  ✓q⇤h. If uh   ul >  ¯h, then asking the quality q⇤h
for the high type violates (16), and so the best the firm can do is to choose qh (ul, uh) defined by
qh (ul, uh) ⌘ uh   ul ✓ .
If uh   ul <  ¯h, the firm o↵ers the high-type an e cient quality: qh (ul, uh) ⌘ q⇤h. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. To see this claim, note that ⇡
 
ul, u2h
   ⇡  ul, u1h  equals (recall our definition
of  k given in (14))
 l (ul)
 
Sl
 
ul, u2h
   Sl  ul, u1h  
+
 
 h
 
u2h
    h  u1h    Sh  ul, u2h   u2h 
+ h
 
u1h
  Sh  ul, u2h   u2h
   Sh  ul, u1h   u1h 
!
.
(17)
The cross-partial @
2
@ul@uh
Sl (ul, uh) is positive if uh ul <  ✓q⇤l and zero otherwise. Thus the first line
of (17) is strictly increasing over ul such that u1h   ul   ✓q⇤l and constant otherwise. The function
Sh
 ·, u2h  is strictly increasing if qh  ul, u2h  > q⇤h and constant otherwise. Thus the second line in
(17) is increasing in ul. The cross-partial
@2
@ul@uh
Sh (ul, uh) is positive if uh   ul >  ✓q⇤h and is zero
otherwise. Thus the third term is strictly increasing over ul such that u2h  ul    ✓q⇤h and constant
otherwise. These arguments imply the result. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. See Section 9 in the Online Appendix. Q.E.D.
Proof of Theorem 1. We proceed in three steps. First, we construct the support function uˆl(·).
In the second step, we derive the equilibrium distribution over menus. In the last step, we show that
firms cannot benefit from deviating to an out-of-equilibrium menu.
In order to better explain the Theorem, we relegate some technical steps to Section 9 in the
Online Appendix (Claims 1- 5).
Step 1 Constructing the support function
Because of the ranking property of kernels, it follows that in any ordered equilibrium with support
function uˆl(·),
⇤ (Fh(uh)|v) = ⇤ (Fl(uˆl(uh))|v) . (18)
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The equation above implies that sales to each type k are proportional to the probability of that type
pk. Accordingly, the support function uˆl(·) describes the locus of indirect utility pairs (uˆl(uh), uh)
such that the proportion of sales to each type is constant.
Claim 1 shows that  h (·) and  l (·) (defined in (14)) are continuously di↵erentiable, what justifies
the first-order conditions (7) and (8). Claim 2 guarantees that if we di↵erentiate (18) we obtain:
uˆ0l(uh) =
⇤1 (Fh(uh)|v) · fh(uh)
⇤ (Fh(uh)|v) ·

⇤1 (Fl(uˆl(uh))|v) · fl(uˆl(uh))
⇤ (Fl(uˆl(uh))|v)
  1
. (19)
Intuitively, the slope of the support function, uˆ0l(uh), equals the ratio between the semi-elasticities
of sales with respect to indirect utilities for each type of consumer.
The first-order conditions (7) and (8) provide an alternative expression for these semi-elasticities.
Evaluated at the locus (uˆl(uh), uh), with the help of (18), equations (7) and (8) can be rewritten as
pk · ⇤1 (Fk(uˆk(uh))|v) · fk(uˆk(uh))⇤ (Fk(uˆk(uh))|v) · (Sk(uˆl(uh), uh)  uk) = pk   pl ·
@Sl
@uk
(uˆl(uh), uh), (20)
for k = h and k = l, respectively. In equilibrium, the optimality of firms’ menus requires that
the support function uˆl(·) simultaneously satisfies the first-order conditions (20) and equation (19).
Combining these two equations leads to the di↵erential equation (11) which describes how the utility
of the low type relates to the utility of the high type in the equilibrium menus.
From Lemma 3, we know that the least generous menu in equilibrium is the Mussa and Rosen
menu (0, umh ). Hence, we require that the solution to (11) satisfy the initial condition uˆl(u
m
h ) = 0.
Next we invoke Claim 3 to assert the existence and uniqueness of the di↵erential equation (11) subject
to uˆl(umh ) = 0. Moreover, Claim 3 shows that uˆ
0
l(uh) > 0 for all uh 2 [umh , u¯h]. This guarantees that
the menus (uˆl(uh), uh) are indeed ordered.
Finally, Claim 4 verifies that the constraint ICl is never binding in any menu (uˆl(uh), uh). Indeed,
we are able to show that, for all uh 2 [umh , u¯h],
uh   uˆl(uh)  u¯h   uˆl(u¯h) < S⇤h   S⇤l < 4✓ · q⇤h,
which, by Lemma 1, implies that ICl is slack at any equilibrium menu.
Step 2 Constructing the distribution over menus
In view of the support function uˆl(·), we can describe the equilibrium distribution over menus
in terms of the distribution of indirect utilities to high type consumers, Fh(·). For that we choose,
for each uh, the quantile Fh(uh) in a way that all menus o↵ered in equilibrium lead to the same
expected profits as the Mussa-Rosen menu Mm. This is reflected in the indi↵erence condition (12).
The argument in Claim 5 shows that the profits conditional on sale
pl (Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)) + ph (Sh (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uh)
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are strictly decreasing in uh. Hence, if we define Fh(·) to satisfy (12).we obtain an increasing and
absolutely continuous function.
In order to complete the construction of Fh(·), we need to determine the support of high type
indirect utilities, ⌥h. By Lemma 3, ⌥h is a closed interval of the form [umh , u¯h], so we are only left
to compute the upper limit of ⌥h, u¯h. Claim 5 shows that there exists a unique u¯h < S⇤h for which
Fh(u¯h) = 1.
Step 3 Verifying the optimality of equilibrium menus
It now remains to check that firms have no incentive to deviate from the putative equilibrium
strategies. By construction, all menus (ul, uh) such that uh 2 [umh , u¯h] and ul = uˆl (uh) yield the same
profit. Moreover, it is easy to show that we may restrict attention to menus (u0l, u
0
h) 2 [umh , u¯h]⇥
[uml , uˆl (u¯h)] . Hence, consider a menu (u
0
l, u
0
h) 2 [umh , u¯h]⇥ [uml , uˆl (u¯h)] such that u0l 6= uˆl (u0h) . We
have that
⇡(uˆl
 
u0h
 
, u0h)  ⇡(u0l, u0h) =
ˆ uˆl(u0h)
u0l
@⇡ (u˜l, u0h)
@ul
du˜l
=
ˆ uˆl(u0h)
u0l
@⇡ (u˜l, u0h)
@ul
  @⇡
 
u˜l, uˆ
 1
l (u˜l)
 
@ul
du˜l
=
ˆ uˆl(u0h)
u0l
ˆ u0h
uˆ 1l (u˜l)
@2⇡ (u˜l, u˜h)
@uh@ul
du˜hdu˜l
  0.
The second equality follows because @⇡(ul,uh)@ul = 0 along the curve {(uˆl (uh) , uh) : uh 2 [umh , u¯h]}. The
inequality follows because @
2⇡(u˜l,u˜h)
@uh@ul
  0 for all (u˜l, u˜h) by Lemma 2. Thus a deviation to menu
(u0l, u
0
h) is unprofitable. This completes the proof of the Theorem 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 1. The proof that 0 < uˆ0l(uh) < 1 can be found in the proof of Claim 3
in Section 9 in the Online Appendix. The proof that uˆl(·) is convex can be found in the proof of
Corollary 3 below. Finally, the proof of uˆ0l (u
m
h ) = 0 follows from evaluating (11) at (0, u
m
h ). Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 2 Denote by Fk and Fˆk (with supports ⌥k and ⌥ˆk) the distributions over
indirect utilities in the ordered equilibrium associated with the degree of competition is v and vˆ,
respectively. We will show that if v > vˆ then Fk first-order stochastically dominates Fˆk, and ⌥ˆk is a
proper subset of ⌥k, for k 2 {l, h}.
We first show that Fh(uh)  Fˆh(uh) for all uh and hence Fh stochastically dominates Fˆh. Since
the support function does not depend on the degree of competition, the last claim implies that Fl
stochastically dominates Fˆl . Towards a contradiction, take u˜h such that Fh(u˜h) > Fˆh(u˜h). Without
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loss assume that u˜h 2 ⌥h (otherwise, replace u˜h with max⌥h). Therefore, we have:
⇤ (0 | v) [plSl (0, umh ) + ph (Sh (0, umh )  umh )]
= ⇤ (Fh(u˜h) | v) [pl (Sl (u˜h, uˆl (u˜h))  uˆl (u˜h)) + ph (Sh (u˜h, uˆl (u˜h))  u˜h)]
and
⇤ (0 | vˆ) [pl · Sl (0, umh ) + ph (Sh (0, umh )  umh )]
= ⇤
⇣
Fˆh(u˜h) | vˆ
⌘
[pl (Sl (u˜h, uˆl (u˜h))  uˆl (u˜h)) + ph (Sh (u˜h, uˆl (u˜h))  u˜h)] ,
and hence
⇤
⇣
Fˆh(u˜h) | vˆ
⌘
⇤ (0 | vˆ) =
⇤ (Fh(u˜h) | v)
⇤ (0 | v) . (21)
On the other hand, Fh(u˜h) > Fˆh(u˜h) implies
⇤(Fh(u˜h)|v)
⇤(0|v) >
⇤(Fˆh(u˜h)|v)
⇤(0|v) .
Since v > vˆ we have
⇤(Fˆh(u˜h)|v)
⇤(0|v) >
⇤(Fˆh(u˜h)|vˆ)
⇤(0|vˆ) . To see this, notice that for a fixed y 2 (0, 1) we
have:
⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)  
⇤ (y|vˆ)
⇤ (0|vˆ) =
1X
j=1
j
✓
!j(v)
!1(v)
◆
yj 1  
1X
j=1
j
✓
!j(vˆ)
!1(vˆ)
◆
yj 1
=
1X
j=1
jyj 1
✓
!j(v)
!1(v)
◆
 
✓
!j(vˆ)
!1(vˆ)
◆ 
.
By the assumption that ⌦(v) dominates ⌦(vˆ) in the sense of likelihood-ratio order, it follows
that if
⇣
!j(v)
!j(vˆ)
⌘
is increasing in j. Hence, for all j, we have
⇣
!j(v)
!j(v)
⌘
 
⇣
!1(v)
!1(v)
⌘
, which implies⇣
!j(v)
!1(v)
⌘
 
⇣
!j(vˆ)
!1(vˆ)
⌘
  0 for all j, with a strict inequality for at least one j > 1. Thus we have
⇤(Fh(u˜h)|v)
⇤(0|v) >
⇤(Fˆh(u˜h)|vˆ)
⇤(0|vˆ) , which contradicts (21).
Since Fh stochastically dominates Fˆh it follows that ⌥ˆk ⇢ ⌥k. Assume towards a contradiction
that ⌥ˆk = ⌥k. In this case, let u¯h the largest indirect utility that is provided to the high type in
both equilibria. By an argument similar to the one above, we obtain
⇤
⇣
Fˆh(u¯h) | vˆ
⌘
⇤ (0 | vˆ) =
⇤ (1 | vˆ)
⇤ (0 | vˆ) =
⇤ (1 | v)
⇤ (0 | v) =
⇤ (Fh(u¯h) | v)
⇤ (0 | v) ,
which cannot happen when v > vˆ. Q.E.D.
Proof of Corollary 3. Because the high-type quality is constant at q⇤h, it is immediate that xh (·)
is decreasing in uh. The same is true regarding the low-type price xl (·) at any uh > uch (since the
low-type quality is constant at q⇤l ). So take uh 2 [umh , uch] and note that
xl (uh) = ✓l
uh   uˆl (uh)
 ✓
  uˆl (uh) .
Consider uˆ0l (uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh), where h is given by
h (ul, uh) =
Sl (ul, uh)  ul
S⇤h   uh
· 1 
pl
ph
@Sl
@uh
(ul, uh)
1  @Sl@ul (ul, uh)
,
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and note that h (0, umh ) = 0 (which implies that uˆ
0
l (u
m
h ) = 0). Therefore, since uˆl (·) and h (·, ·) are
continuous,
x0l (uh) = ✓l
1  uˆ0l (uh)
 ✓
  uˆ0l (uh) = ✓l
1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)
 ✓
  h (uˆl (uh) , uh) > 0
for all uh su ciently close to umh .
Recall that there is a unique threshold uch, above which low-type quality is e cient. The threshold
uch is the the unique value of uh solving uh   uˆl (uh) = 4✓ · q⇤l . Trivially we have x0l (uh) < 0 for all
uh   uch. We will now show that uˆl (·) is convex for uh < uch. Note that the convexity of uˆl (·) and
the facts that x0l (u
m
h ) > 0 and x
0
l (u
c
h) < 0 imply that there exists a unique u
d
h 2 (umh , uch] such that
x0l (uh) > 0 if and only if uh < u
d
h. To see why uˆl (·) is convex, let us di↵erentiate (11) to obtain that
uˆ00l (uh) =
d
duh
Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh) + uˆ0l (uh) ·
⇣
1
5(uh)   1
⌘
S⇤h   uh
+
Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)
S⇤h   uh
·50(uh), (22)
where
5(uh) ⌘
1  plph
@Sl
@uh
(uˆl (uh) , uh)
1  @Sl@ul (uˆl (uh) , uh)
.
Recall from the proof of Claim 3 (in the paragraph before Equation (40)) that 5(uh) 2 (0, 1) for
uh < uch and that
d
duh
Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh) > 0. Moreover, straightforward di↵erentiation shows that
50(uh) > 0. Coupled together, these facts imply that uˆ00l (uh) > 0 for uh < uch, as claimed. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1. Follows directly from Corollary 3. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that we have xl (uh) ⌘ ✓l · ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh) and xh (uh) ⌘
✓h · q⇤h   uh.
First assume that uh < uch. In this case, since  p (uh) ⌘ xh (uh)  xl (uh) , we have
 0p(uh) =  1 

✓l
1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)
 ✓
  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)
 
=  
✓
✓h
 ✓
◆
[1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)] < 0,
because h (uˆl (uh) , uh) < 1.
Next assume that uh   uch. In this case, we have  p (uh) = uˆl (uh)   uh and hence  0p(uh) =
  [1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)] < 0. We conclude that  p (uh) is strictly decreasing in uh, which immediately
implies the proposition. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. To show the result, it su ces to show that the markup di↵erence is strictly
decreasing in uh. The markup di↵erence can be written as: [S⇤h   uh]   [Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)] .
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First notice that
d[S⇤h uh]
duh
=  1. Moreover, we have
d
duh
[Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)]
=
dSl (ql(uˆl (uh) , uh))
dql
✓
@ql(uˆl (uh) , uh)
@ul
uˆ0l (uh) +
@ql(uˆl (uh) , uh)
@uh
◆
  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)
=
dSl (ql(uˆl (uh) , uh))
dql
@ql(uˆl (uh) , uh)
@uh
(1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh))  h (uˆl (uh) , uh) .
Therefore we obtain
d ([S⇤h   uh]  [Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)])
duh
=   (1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh))  dSl (ql(uˆl (uh) , uh))dql
@ql(uˆl (uh) , uh)
@uh
(1  h (uˆl (uh) , uh)) < 0,
which proves the Proposition. Q.E.D.
A New Indexation of Contracts
For k 2 {l, h} , let wk (uk) ⌘ ⇤(Fk(uk)|v)⇤(0|v) be the ratio between the sales to type k of an o↵er with
payo↵ uk and the sales of the monopoly o↵er (with payo↵ umk ). Since the monopolist’s o↵er (0, u
m
h )
is always the less generous o↵er made in equilibrium (hence it yields the sales ⇤ (0|v)), every o↵er
(ul, uh) that is optimal must satisfy:
wl (ul) pl (Sl (ul, uh)  ul) + wh (uh) ph (S⇤h   uh) = plSl (uml , umh ) + ph [S⇤h   umh ] . (23)
Recall that our sale function depends only on the ranking yk = Fk(uk). Therefore, for every
w 2
h
1, ⇤(1|v)⇤(0|v)
i
, there is a unique y 2 [0, 1] such that w = ⇤(y|v)⇤(0|v) . Hence, for all w 2
h
1, ⇤(1|v)⇤(0|v)
i
,
we may define y(w) implicitly by: w = ⇤(y(w)|v)⇤(0|v) . Moreover, in any ordered equilibrium we have
wl (ul) = wh (uh) and the ranking of the menu (yk = Fk(uk)) is a strictly increasing function of
uk. Thus, since w ! y(w) is strictly increasing, so is its inverse, which implies that the mapping
uk ! w(uk) is strictly increasing. It thus follows that we can index contracts by w and rewrite (23)
as
wpl (Sl (ul(w), uh(w))  ul(w)) + wph (S⇤h   uh(w)) = plSl (uml , umh ) + ph [S⇤h   umh ] , (24)
for every w 2
h
1, ⇤(1|v)⇤(0|v)
i
.
Proof of Proposition 4. From the discussion right above this proof, we know that there is a
one-to-one mapping between the ranking of the o↵er y = Fk(uk) and the variable w. Hence, take
w 2
h
1, ⇤(1|v)⇤(0|v)
⌘
, consider an increase in pl from pal to p
b
l and let, for r 2 {a, b} and k 2 {l, h} ,
urk(w) be the indirect utility yielded by an o↵er with generosity w to type k in the unique ordered
equilibrium in which the probability that consumer is a low type is prl . Claim 7 (see Section 9 in the
Online Appendix) shows that ubh(w) > u
a
h(w).
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First assume that uah(w)  ubh(0). In this case, we have
ubh(w)  ubl (w) > ubh(0)  ubl (0) = ubh(0)   uah(w)   uah(w)  ual (w), (25)
where the first inequality used the fact that uˆ0l(uh) < 1 for any equilibrium (see Corollary 1).
Next assume that uah(w) > u
b
h(0). In this case, there exists w˜ 2 (1, w) such that ubh(w˜) = uah(w).
It follows that
ubh(w)  ubl (w) > ubh(w˜)  ubl (w˜) = ubh(w˜)  uˆbl
⇣
ubh(w˜)
⌘
, (26)
where, for r 2 {a, b} , we write uˆrl (·) for the support function of the ordered equilibrium in which
the probability that the consumer is a low type is prl . Claim 6 (stated and proved in Section 9 in
the Online Appendix) shows that @uˆl(uh,pl)@pl < 0 and hence uˆ
a
l
 
ubh(w˜)
 
> uˆbl
 
ubh(w˜)
 
, which implies
ubh(w˜)   uˆbl
 
ubh(w˜)
 
> ubh(w˜)   uˆal
 
ubh(w˜)
 
. Finally, since ubh(w˜) = u
a
h(w) the last inequality implies
ubh(w˜)  uˆbl
 
ubh(w˜)
 
> uah(w)  uˆal (uah(w)) = uah(w)  ual (w). Combining this inequality with (26) we
obtain
ubh(w)  ubl (w) > uah(w)  ual (w). (27)
Therefore, we always have ubh(w)  ubl (w) > uah(w)  ual (w). Since (3) implies that ql (ul, uh) is a
nondecreasing function of the di↵erence (uh   ul), we conclude that for each w (and hence for each
ranking y(w)), the low-type quality is weakly more e cient in equilibrium pbl . Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. The price di↵erential satisfies
 p (uh) = [✓h · q⇤h   ✓l · ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)]  [uh   uˆl (uh)] .
From Corollary 1 we have uˆ0l(uh) < 1 and hence [uh   uˆl (uh)] strictly increases with uh. Next
(3) implies that ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) increases with the di↵erence [uh   uˆl (uh)] and hence ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)
increases with uh. This implies that  p (uh) strictly decreases in uh. Indexing the contracts for w
instead of uh, we immediately see that  p (w) is strictly decreasing in w.
Now define y(w, v) implicitly by
⇣
⇤(y(w,v)|v)
⇤(0|v)
⌘
= w. Take v00 > v0 and notice that
⇣
⇤(y(w,v0)|v00)
⇤(0|v00)
⌘
>⇣
⇤(y(w,v0)|v00)
⇤(0|v00)
⌘
= w, which implies that y(w, v00) < y(w, v0). Hence y(w˜, v00) = y(w, v0) implies w˜ > w.
Therefore, since we have shown that  p (w) is strictly decreasing in w, we conclude that  ˜p (y) is
strictly decreasing in v.
Next we will show that  ˜p (y) is decreasing in pl. Fix y 2 (0, 1) and notice that the w that
solves the equation
⇣
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
⌘
= w does not depend on pl. Hence, consider an increase in pl from pal to
pbl . Using the notation introduced in the proof of Proposition 4, the argument that we used in that
proof implies that ubh(w)  ubl (w) > uah(w)  ual (w). Thus if, for r 2 {a, b} , we let  rp (y) be the price
di↵erential when the probability that the consumer is a low type is prl , we have
 bp (y)  ap (y) = ✓l
h
ql (u
a
l (w) , u
a
h(w))  ql
⇣
ubl (w) , u
b
h(w)
⌘i
+
h
(uah(w)  ual (w)) 
⇣
ubh(w)  ubl (w)
⌘i
,
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which is less than zero, since
ql (u
a
l (w) , u
a
h(w))  ql
⇣
ubl (w) , u
b
h(w)
⌘
and
uah(w)  ual (w)  ubh(w)  ubl (w),
as shown in the proof of Proposition 4.
Finally, we show that if the degree of competition is su ciently high (v > v¯), the marginal
impact of v on  ˜p (y) (in absolute terms) is decreasing in pl. Let, for k 2 {l, h} and y 2 (0, 1) , uyk
be defined by Fk(u
y
k) = y. Note first that there exists v¯ such that for v   v¯ we have uyh uyl >  ✓q⇤l .
Then, for all such v, we have
@ ˜p (y)
@v
=
@
 
uyh   uyl
 
@v
=
@uyh
@v
 
1 
@uyl
@v
@uyh
@v
!
=
@uyh
@v
 
1  uˆ0l
 
uyh
  
=
@uyh
@v
0@1  Sl(uˆl(uyh), uyh)  uˆl(uyh)
S⇤h   uyh
·
1  plph ·
@Sl
@uyh
(uˆl(u
y
h), u
y
h)
1  @Sl
@uyl
(uˆl(u
y
h), u
y
h)
1A
=
@uyh
@v
✓
1  Sl(uˆl(u
y
h), u
y
h)  uˆl(uyh)
S⇤h   uyh
◆
.
where the third equality uses (11) and the final equality uses the fact the incentive constraints are
slack at the quantile y for large enough v.
Next, consider p##l , p
#
l such that p
##
l < p
#
l . Therefore we have
d
dpl
✓
S⇤l   uˆl(uyh(pl), pl)
S⇤h   uyh(pl)
◆
=
0@ @uˆl(uyh(pl),pl)@uyh ⇥S⇤h   uyh(pl)⇤  uyh 0 (pl) +  uyh 0 (pl) ⇥S⇤l   uˆl(uyh(pl), pl)⇤  @uˆl(uyh(pl),pl)@pl ⇥S⇤h   uyh(pl)⇤⇥
S⇤h   uyh(pl)
⇤2
1A
=
0@ @uˆl(uyh(pl),pl)@pl ⇥S⇤h   uyh(pl)⇤⇥
S⇤h   uyh(pl)
⇤2
1A > 0,
where the second line uses  @uˆl(u
y
h(pl),pl)
@uyh
=
S⇤l  uˆl(uyh)
S⇤h uyh
and
@uˆl(u
y
h(pl),pl)
@pl
< 0 follows from Claim 6.
Thus we have
@
@pl
✓
1  Sl(uˆl(u
y
h), u
y
h)  uˆl(uyh)
S⇤h   uyh
◆
< 0. (28)
Now, let wk =
⇤(Fk(uk)|v)
⇤(0|v) be the ratio of sales for an o↵er with payo↵ uk to the sales for the monopoly
o↵er to type k (with payo↵ umk ). Here we find convenient to index all contracts by the ratio of sales.
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Let uk (wk) be the indirect utility of type k such that the sales ratio is wk. It is easily verified that,
for all large enough v, incentive constraints are slack when the sales ratio is wk =
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v) for each k.
It follows that we can write the expected profits by
wlpl
 
S⇤l   uyl (wl)
 
+ whph
 
S⇤h   uyh (wh)
 
for all (wl, wh) in a su ciently small neighborhood of
⇣
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v) ,
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
⌘
. A first-order condition with
respect to wh yields
u0h
✓
⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)
◆
=
S⇤h   uyh (wh)
wh
=
S⇤h   uyh
⇣
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
⌘
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
.
Hence
@uyh
@v
= u0h
✓
⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)
◆
d
dv

⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)
 
=
✓
S⇤h   uyh
✓
⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)
◆◆
d
dv

⇤ (y|v)
⇤ (0|v)
 
> 0, (29)
where ddv
h
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
i
> 0 holds by our assumptions on the matching function. Again consider p##l , p
#
l
such that p##l < p
#
l , and index payo↵s accordingly. Let w =
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v) . Claim 7 (in Section 9 in the
Online Appendix) shows that u##h (w) < u
#
h (w), i.e. S
⇤
h   uyh
⇣
⇤(y|v)
⇤(0|v)
⌘
is larger when pl is smaller.
Thus using (29) we conclude that
@2uyh
@pl@v
< 0. (30)
Combining (28), (29) and (30) we obtain
@2 ˜p (y)
@pl@v
=
@2
 
uyh   uyl
 
@pl@v
=
@2uyh
@v@pl
 
1 
@uyl
@v
@uyh
@v
!
+
✓
@uyh
@v
◆"
@
@pl
 
1 
@uyl
@v
@uyh
@v
!#
< 0.
Q.E.D.
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8 Appendix B: Uniqueness
This appendix describes when the ordered equilibrium of Theorem 1 is the only equilibrium. Recall
from Lemma 2 that a firm’s expected profits ⇡ satisfy strict increasing di↵erences when the incentive
constraint ICh binds (i.e., for menus with uh  uch, where recall that uch is the e ciency threshold
specified in the previous subsection). In this case, we argued that higher indirect utilities uh must
imply higher indirect utilities to low types ul, i.e. the equilibrium menus must be ordered. Hence, if
ICh binds for all equilibrium menus, ordering is enough to uniquely pin down equilibrium.
However, if ICh is slack, firms o↵ering high indirect utilities uh to high types no longer have a
comparative advantage in o↵ering high utilities ul to low types, and so equilibrium menus need not
be ordered. A multiplicity of equilibria then arises due to the possible non-ordering of menus for
which the incentive constraint ICh is slack (i.e., menus for which uh > uch). We summarize these
observations as follows.
Theorem 2 [Equilibrium Uniqueness] There exists a threshold vc > 0 on the degree of competi-
tion such that:
1. if v  vc, the top of the support of Fh, u¯h, satisfies u¯h  uch. The downward incentive constraint
(ICh) is then binding for all menus o↵ered in the ordered equilibrium. In this case, the only
equilibrium is the ordered equilibrium.
2. if v > vc, then u¯h > uch, and the downward incentive constraint (ICh) is slack for all menus
in the ordered equilibrium with uh > uch, and binding for uh  uch. In this case, there exist
multiple equilibria that di↵er only in the menus for which uh > uch (i.e., the e cient menus).
However, all equilibria (including the non-ordered ones) lead to the same marginal distributions
over indirect utilities Fk(·), and the same ex-ante profits for firms.
The proof, presented below, shows that in any equilibrium, when the degree of competition is
small (i.e., v  vc), the support of utilities of type-k consumers, ⌥k, is contained in [umk , uck]. Using
the increasing di↵erences property (see Lemma 2), we show that this implies that all equilibria are
equal to the ordered equilibrium.
By contrast, when the degree of competition is large (i.e., v > vc), some menus o↵ered in the
ordered equilibrium exhibit non-binding incentive constraints. Consider such a menu (uˆl(uh), uh),
in which case uh 2 (uch, u¯h]. For this menu, the profit function ⇡(ul, uh) is locally modular, i.e. its
cross-partial derivative is zero. As a result, for some (small) " > 0, both the menus (uˆl(uh   "), uh)
and (uˆl(uh), uh   ") are profit-maximizing for the firm. Based on the ordered equilibrium, we can
1
thus construct a non-ordered equilibrium by replacing the menus (uˆl(uh), uh) and (uˆl(uh "), uh ")
by their non-ordered counterparts (uˆl(uh "), uh) and (uˆl(uh), uh "). Theorem 2 confirms that this
is the unique source of multiplicity of equilibria in our economy.
Proof of Theorem 2. For the unique ordered distribution described in Theorem 1, there is a
value vc such that v  vc implies u¯h  uch, while v > vc implies u¯h > uch. What remains to show
is that, for v  vc, the only equilibrium is the ordered equilibrium (i.e., Part 1 of the Theorem) as
well as the uniqueness claims in Part 2 (i.e., regarding menus with payo↵s uh  uch and regarding
the marginal distributions Fk).
Let F˜ be any distribution over menus which describes a (not necessarily ordered) equilibrium.
Let the marginal distributions over indirect utilities be given by Fk with supports ⌥k as given in
Lemma 3. We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Consider two equilibrium menus (ul, uh) , (u0l, u
0
h) 2 ⌥l ⇥ ⌥h. If u0h > uh, then either
u0l   ul or both ICh and ICl are slack for both menus (i.e., uh   ul, u0h   u0l 2 [q⇤l ✓, q⇤h ✓]).
Proof. Suppose u0h > uh and u
0
l < ul, while either uh  ul /2 [q⇤l ✓, q⇤h ✓] or u0h  u0l /2 [q⇤l ✓, q⇤h ✓].
By Lemma 2, we have
⇡
 
ul, u
0
h
 
+ ⇡
 
u0l, uh
 
> ⇡
 
u0l, u
0
h
 
+ ⇡ (ul, uh) ,
contradicting the optimality of (ul, uh) or (u0l, u
0
h). Q.E.D.
An immediate implication of this lemma is that if (ul, uh) is a menu for which ICl or ICh binds
(i.e., uh   ul /2 [q⇤l ✓, q⇤h ✓]), then there exists no other equilibrium menu (u0l, u0h) for which u0l < ul
and u0h > uh or u
0
l > ul and u
0
h < uh. Since Fl and Fh are absolutely continuous by Lemma 3, we
can conclude hence that Fl (ul) = Fh (uh).
Next, note that there exists " > 0 such that ICh binds for all uh  umh +". Thus, for every menu
(ul, uh) with uh  umh + ", we have Fl (ul) = Fh (uh). Define a strictly increasing and continuous
function  by  (uh) ⌘ F 1l (Fh (uh)) (here we use Lemma 3 which guarantees both the continuity
of Fl and Fh and that both are strictly increasing). Using Lemma 4, it is easy to see that there can
be no menu (ul, uh) with ul <  (umh + ") but ul 6=  (uh). Thus, we have established that, for any
equilibrium menu (ul, uh), with uh < umh + " or ul <  (u
m
h + "), ul =  (uh). The arguments in Step
1 of the proof of Theorem 1 then imply that  (·) = uˆl (·) on [umh , umh + ").
We can extend the above argument to show that all menus (ul, uh) with uh < uch or ul < uˆl (u
c
h)
must also be given by (uˆl (uh) , uh) for some uh < uch. To see this, let
u˘h ⌘ sup
 
uh : 8 eqm menus
 
u0l, u
0
h
 
, u0h < uh or u
0
l < uˆl (uh) implies u
0
l = uˆl
 
u0h
  
. (31)
As argued above, u˘h > umh . Suppose with a view to contradiction that u˘h < u
c
h. Since we must
have ul   uˆl (u˘h) for any equilibrium menu with uh   u˘h, there must exist ⌘ > 0 su ciently small
2
that ICh binds for all uh  u˘h + ⌘ (indeed, this must follow because ICh binds at (uˆl (u˘h) , u˘h)).
The same arguments as above then imply that, for any equilibrium menu (ul, uh) with uh < u˘h + ⌘
or ul < uˆl (u˘h + ⌘), ul = uˆl (uh). Hence, u˘h cannot be the supremum in (31), our contradiction.
Thus, we have established that u˘h   uch. This establishes Part 1 of the proposition: In case
v  vc, we have uh  uch for all equilibrium menus, as implied by the requirement that all menus
generate the same expected profits. This also establishes our claim in Part 2 that non-ordered
equilibria di↵er only in menus for which uh > uch (the existence of such non-ordered equilibria is
straightforward and left to the reader).
To establish our remaining claims, we consider menus for which uh   uch and ul   uˆl (uch). We
show that (recall our definition of  k given in (14))
 0h (uh) =
 h (uh)
S⇤h   uh
(32)
 0l (ul) =
 l (ul)
S⇤l   ul
(33)
for these values of uh and ul. This implies that  l and  h are precisely those functions determined
in Theorem 1; hence, the marginal distributions Fk are identical in any equilibrium. As a result, as
shown in the proof of Theorem 1, neither incentive constraint can bind for equilibrium menus with
uh   uch and ul   uˆl (uch) (a binding incentive constraint at (ul, uh) would imply Fl (ul) = Fh (uh),
but then ul = uˆl (uh) and neither incentive constraint binds at (uˆl (uh) , uh) as shown in the proof of
Theorem 1).
It is easy to see that the equilibrium menu with high-type payo↵ uch is unique and equal to
(uˆl (uch) , u
c
h).
30 Neither of the incentive constraints ICl or ICh bind at this menu. This allows us to
establish that (32) and (33) hold at (uˆl (uch) , u
c
h). We consider (32) as the case of (33) is analogous.
We use a similar argument to that in Step 1 of the proof of Theorem 1. For any " 2 R such that
uch + " 2 ⌥h, let (ul,", uch + ") be a corresponding equilibrium menu. The same arguments as in the
proof of Theorem 1 imply 
 l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uch)  Sl(ul,", uch + ")]
+ h (uch) [Sh(ul,", u
c
h)  Sh(ul,", uch + ") + "]
!
"
⇥
Sh(ul,", uch + ")  uch   "
⇤
  h (u
c
h + ")   h (uch)
"

 
 l (uˆl (uch)) [Sl(uˆl (u
c
h) , u
c
h)  Sl(uˆl (uch) , uch + ")]
+ h (uch) [Sh(uˆl (u
c
h) , u
c
h)  Sh(uˆl (uch) , uch + ") + "]
!
"
⇥
Sh(uˆl
 
uch
 
, uch + ")  uch   "
⇤ .
30By the previous argument, any equilibrium menu (ul, u
c
h) must satisfy ul   uˆl (uch). If ul > uˆl (uch), then ICh binds
at (ul, u
c
h) implying that Fl (ul) = Fh (u
c
h), a contradiction (since Fh (u
c
h) = Fl (uˆl (u
c
h)) by the previous argument and
continuity of Fl and Fh).
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We then use that31
lim
"!0
Sl(ul,", uch)  Sl(ul,", uch + ")
"
= lim
"!0
Sl(uˆl (uch) , u
c
h)  Sl(uˆl (uch) , uch + ")
"
= 0
and
Sh(ul,", u
c
h)  Sh(ul,", uch + ") = Sh(uˆl (uch) , uch)  Sh(uˆl (uch) , uch + ") = 0
to conclude that
 0h (u
c
h) =
 h (uch)
S⇤h   uch
.
Next, observe that there exists ⌘ > 0 such that incentive constraints are slack for any equilibrium
menu with uh 2 [uch, uch + ⌘]. This is obtained from (i) the above observation that if (ul, uh) is a
menu for which an incentive constraint ICk binds, then Fl (ul) = Fh (uh), and (ii) uch uˆl (uch) = q⇤l ✓
together with  0h (u
c
h) <  
0
l (uˆl (u
c
h)) (equivalently, F
0
h (u
c
h) < F
0
l (uˆl (u
c
h))).
As with the derivatives  0h (u
c
h) and  
0
l (uˆl (u
c
h)), one obtains (32) and (33) on [u
c
h, u
c
h + ⌘]. We
then use again that Fl (ul) = Fh (uh) for any menu (ul, uh) for which an incentive constraint binds
to obtain that the constraints must be slack for any equilibrium menu with uh   uch. To see this,
let
u#h = sup
 
uh : ICl and ICh are slack for all eqm. menus
 
u0l, u
0
h
 
with u0h 2 [uch, uh]
 
.
The above property, together with continuity of Fl and Fh, implies that, if u
#
h < u¯h, then u
#
h  u#l /2
( ✓q⇤l , ✓q
⇤
h) for u
#
l satisfying Fl
⇣
u#l
⌘
= Fh
⇣
u#h
⌘
. However, Fl and Fh must agree with functions
derived in Theorem 1 on, respectively,
h
uml , uˆl
⇣
u#h
⌘i
and
h
umh , u
#
h
i
. Hence u#l = uˆl
⇣
u#h
⌘
. This
contradicts our finding in the proof of Theorem 1 that u#h   uˆl
⇣
u#h
⌘
2 ( ✓q⇤l , ✓q⇤h). Q.E.D.
9 Appendix C: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3. We divide the proof in five steps.
Step 1 No mass points in the distribution of high-type o↵ers.
We begin by showing that Fh has no mass points. Assume towards a contradiction there is an
atom of firms o↵ering u˜h.
We first show that, if a firm makes an equilibrium o↵er (u˜l, u˜h), for some value u˜l, then
Sh(u˜l, u˜h) u˜h > 0. Suppose not. Then it must be that Sl(u˜l, u˜h) u˜l  0 (in case Sh(u˜l, u˜h) u˜h  0
31This follows after noticing that, for any ⌫ > 0, there exists ◆ > 0 such that, for all |"| < ◆, uch ul," 2 ( ✓q⇤l  ⌫, ✓q⇤h].
This follows after noticing that either both incentive constraints are slack at (ul,", u
c
h+ "), or one of ICl and ICh bind,
in which case ul," = F
 1
l (Fh (u
c
h + ")), which tends to uˆl (u
c
h) as "! 0.
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and Sl(u˜l, u˜h)   u˜l > 0, o↵ering only the option designed for the low type improves the seller’s ex-
pected profit because high types accept such an o↵er with positive probability). Hence, ⇡ (u˜l, u˜h)  0.
This contradicts seller optimization. Indeed, the seller could o↵er a menu which yields the Mussa
and Rosen utilities (uml , u
m
h ) and obtain a payo↵ at least as large as (S
⇤
h   umh ) h (0) > 0.
Next, notice that Sl(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜l   0. If not, the seller can profit by o↵ering the menu (ql, xl) =
(0, 0) and (qh, xh) = (q⇤h, ✓hq
⇤
h   u˜h). Irrespective of whether the low type finds it incentive compat-
ible to choose the option (0, 0), the seller is guaranteed an expected profit at least as high as under
the original menu.
These two observations imply that ⇡ (u˜l + ", u˜h + ") > ⇡ (u˜l, u˜h) for " > 0 su ciently small,
contradicting the optimality of (u˜l, u˜h). To see this, note that ⇡ (u˜l + ", u˜h + ") must be bounded
below by
⇡ (u˜l, u˜h)  " [ h (u˜h + ") +  l (u˜l + ")]
+ (Sh(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜h   ") [ h (u˜h + ")   h (u˜h)] ,
where  k is defined in (14). Since  h (u˜h + ")   h (u˜h) is bounded above zero as "& 0, and since
Sh(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜h > 0, the expression above is greater than ⇡ (u˜l, u˜h) whenever " is su ciently small.
Step 2 No mass points in the distribution of low-type o↵ers.
First, we show that there are no mass points in Fl at any ul > 0. Suppose towards a contradiction
that Fl has a mass point at some u˜l > 0. Take a firm that o↵ers (u˜l, u˜h) . Since, as reasoned above,
Sl(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜l   0, we can consider two cases.
Case 1: Sl(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜l > 0.
As noted in Step 1, the expected profit conditional on selling to a high type must also be positive.
Notice that in this case ⇡ (u˜l + ", u˜h + ") is bounded below by
⇡ (u˜l, u˜h)  " [ h (u˜h + ") +  l (u˜l + ")]
+ (Sl(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜l   ") ( l (u˜l + ")   l (u˜l)) .
Since  l has a mass point at u˜l, and since Sl(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜l > 0, the expression above is strictly greater
than ⇡ (u˜l, u˜h) for " > 0 su ciently small.
Case 2: Sl(u˜l, u˜h) u˜l = 0. Let {(ql, xl) , (qh, xh)} = {(ql (u˜l, u˜h) , xl (u˜l, u˜h)) , (qh (u˜l, u˜h) , xh (u˜l, u˜h))}
be the menu o↵ered by the firm. Consider a deviation to the menu {(ql, xl + ") , (qh, xh)} for some
" 2 (0, u˜l) . This menu generates the same expected profits from high types and is accepted with
positive probability by low types. Moreover, since Sh(u˜l, u˜h)  u˜h > 0 (see Step 1), the seller makes
positive profits whether a low-type buyer chooses the option (ql, xl + ") or (qh, xh). That is, expected
profits from low types are strictly positive under the deviating o↵er.
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Finally, we show that there can be no mass point in Fl at zero. Assume towards a contradiction
that Fl(0) > 0. From Step 1 (i.e., since there are no mass points in the distribution of high-type
o↵ers), menus (ul, uh) 2 {0}⇥ [",1) are then o↵ered with positive probability. It is easy to see that
there is   > 0 such that Sl (0, uh) >   for all uh 2 [",1). Therefore, for small ⌘ > 0 the di↵erence
⇡ (⌘, uh)  ⇡ (0, uh) is
( l (⌘)   l (0)) [Sl (⌘, uh)  ⌘]
  l (0) (Sl (0, uh)  Sl (⌘, uh)  ⌘) .
(34)
We can take ⌘⇤ such that ⌘ 2 (0, ⌘⇤) implies that the first line of (34) is at least ( l (0+)   l (0))
  
2
 
>
0. Moreover, the second line of (34) converges to 0 as ⌘ & 0, which shows a profitable deviation.
Step 3 The supports ⌥k are intervals.
Suppose for a contradiction that one or both of the supports are disconnected sets. Assume that
⌥l is disconnected. Then there are u0l and u
00
l in ⌥l with u
0
l < u
00
l such that (u
0
l, u
00
l )\⌥l = ;. Consider
values u0h and u
00
h such that (u
0
l, u
0
h) and (u
00
l , u
00
h) are optimal. From Steps 1 and 2 and Lemma 2 we
may assume that  l (u0l) =  l (u
00
l ),  h (u
0
h) =  h (u
00
h) and u
0
h  u00h.
If u0h < u
00
h then there is " > 0 for which ⇡ (u
00
l   ", u00h   ") > ⇡ (u00l , u00h) . Thus assume that
u0h = u
00
h. For any " 2 (0, u00l   u0l), optimality requires ⇡ (u00l   ", u00h)  ⇡ (u00l , u00h). This implies that
qh (u00l , u
00
h) > q
⇤
h, i.e. ICl binds. Thus
@2Sh(ul,uh)
@u2l
< 0 at (u00l , u
00
h) , which implies (using  l (u
0
l) =
 l (u00l )) that ⇡ ( u
0
l + (1   )u00l , u00h) >  ⇡ (u0l, u00h) + (1   )⇡ (u00l , u00h) for   2 (0, 1). Hence, (u00l , u00h)
is not optimal. The proof that ⌥h is connected is analogous and omitted.
Step 4 The minimum of the supports ⌥l and ⌥h are, respectively, uml = 0 and u
m
h .
Let ul and uh be the minimum of the supports of ⌥l and ⌥h respectively. It follows from Steps
1 and 2 and from Lemma 2 that (ul, uh) is an optimal menu. IR requires ul   0, and we next show
that ul = 0. To see this, suppose that ul > 0 and note that uh   ul. Since  l (0) =  l (ul) and
 h (uh   ul) =  h (uh) , we have ⇡ (0, uh   ul) > ⇡ (ul, uh) , a contradiction. Hence indeed ul = 0
and so uh   0 maximizes
 l (0)Sl (0, uh) +  h (0) (Sh (0, uh)  uh) . (35)
Since umh is the only maximizer of (35), the claim follows. We have thus established that, for each
k 2 {l, h}, the support ⌥k is equal to [umk , u¯k], where u¯k > umk .
Step 5 Fl and Fh are absolutely continuous.
We will show that Fh is Lipschitz continuous (the proof that Fl is absolutely continuous is
analogous and omitted). Notice that from 2. in Assumption 1 it su ces to show that  h is Lipschitz
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continuous. For that, it is enough to show that there are positive values K and   such that, for all
uh 2 ⌥h and all " 2 (0,  ),  h (uh + ")   h (uh) < K" .
First, we claim that we may find a constant Sh > 0 such that we have Sh (u
0
l, u
0
h)   u0h   Sh
for every optimal menu (u0l, u
0
h) . The claim follows by the same logic as in Step 1. If the claim
does not hold, we may find a sequence of optimal menus (unl , u
n
h) such that Sh (u
n
l , u
n
h)   unh  1n .
Taking a subsequence if necessary, assume that (unl , u
n
h)! (u⇤l , u⇤h) . By the continuity of  k (Steps
1 and 2) and the continuity of Sk (for k 2 {l, h}) we conclude that (u⇤l , u⇤h) is optimal and that
Sh (u⇤l , u
⇤
h)  u⇤h = 0. However, we showed in Step 1 that such a menu cannot be optimal.
Next, let   > 0 and define ⇠h ⌘ sup(u˜l,u˜h)2{[0,u¯l]⇥[umh ,u¯h+ ]:u˜h u˜l}
   @Sh(u˜l,u˜h)@uh    . Take any equilib-
rium menu (ul, uh) 2 ⌥l ⇥⌥h. Notice that, for " 2 (0,  ), ⇡ (ul, uh + ") is
 l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh + ")  ul] +  h (uh + ") [Sh(ul, uh + ")  uh   "]
 
"
 l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh)  ul] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul, uh)  uh]
  h (u¯h) (⇠h + 1) "+ [ h (uh + ")   h (uh)] (Sh   (⇠h + 1) ")
#
.
Since ⇡ (ul, uh + ")  ⇡ (ul, uh) we have:
 h (uh + ")   h (uh)
"
  h (u¯h) (⇠h + 1)
Sh   (⇠h + 1) "
<
 h (u¯h) (⇠h + 1)
Sh   (⇠h + 1)  
.
Since Part 3 of Assumption 1 implies  h (u¯h) < +1, it is then easy to see that our claim holds
provided K is su ciently large and   su ciently small. Q.E.D.
Claim 1 The functions  h (·) and  l (·) are continuously di↵erentiable.
Proof We first show that  h (·) and  l (·) are continuously di↵erentiable. By Assumption
1.2, this implies that each Fk (uk) is continuously di↵erentiable as well. Hence, the firm’s profits
⇡ (ul, uh) as defined by (6) are continuously di↵erentiable, with first-order conditions given by (7)
and (8).
We focus on the claim that  h (·) is continuously di↵erentiable, as the case of  l (·) is analogous.
Let uh 2 ⌥h and suppose that ul = uˆl (uh), so that (ul, uh) is an optimal menu. Note that for any
" 2 R, we have
 l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh + ")  ul] +  h (uh + ") [Sh(ul, uh + ")  uh   "]
=  l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh)  ul] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul, uh)  uh]
+ l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh + ")  Sl(ul, uh)] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul, uh + ")  "  Sh(ul, uh)]
+ [ h (uh + ")   h (uh)] [Sh(ul, uh + ")  uh   "] .
Since ⇡ (ul, uh)   ⇡ (ul, uh + "), we have
[ h (uh + ")   h (uh)] [Sh(ul, uh + ")  uh   "]
  l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh)  Sl(ul, uh + ")] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul, uh)  Sh(ul, uh + ") + "] .
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Next, for any " 2 R such that uh + " 2 ⌥h, let ul," = uˆl (uh + "). Thus, we have
 l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uh + ")  ul,"] +  h (uh + ") [Sh(ul,", uh + ")  uh   "]
=  l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uh)  ul,"] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul,", uh)  uh]
+ l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uh + ")  Sl(ul,", uh)] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul,", uh + ")  "  Sh(ul,", uh)]
+ [ h (uh + ")   h (uh)] [Sh(ul,", uh + ")  uh   "] .
Since ⇡ (ul,", uh + ")   ⇡(ul,", uh), we have
[ h (uh + ")   h (uh)] [Sh(ul,", uh + ")  uh   "]
   l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uh)  Sl(ul,", uh + ")] +  h (uh) [Sh(ul,", uh)  Sh(ul,", uh + ") + "] .
For the right derivative we now consider " > 0 (the case of the left derivative is analogous). For any
" su ciently small, we have Sh(ul, uh + ")   uh   " > 0 (to see this, consider the argument in Step
1 of the proof of Lemma 3). For all such ", we have 
 l (ul,") [Sl(ul,", uh)  Sl(ul,", uh + ")]
+ h (uh) [Sh(ul,", uh)  Sh(ul,", uh + ") + "]
!
" [Sh(ul,", uh + ")  uh   "] 
 h (uh + ")   h (uh)
"

 
 l (ul) [Sl(ul, uh)  Sl(ul, uh + ")]
+ h (uh) [Sh(ul, uh)  Sh(ul, uh + ") + "]
!
" [Sh(ul, uh + ")  uh   "] .
Next, note that uˆl (·) must be continuous by Lemma 3, since each Fk is continuous and Fl (uˆl (uh)) =
Fh (uh) for all uh. Hence ul," & ul as " & 0, implying that the right derivative of  h (uh) is equal
to
  l (ul) @Sl(ul,uh)@uh +  h (uh)
⇣
1  @Sh(ul,uh)@uh
⌘
Sh(ul, uh)  uh
The left derivative can similarly be shown to take the same value, i.e.,  h (uh) is di↵erentiable at uh.
Using our assumption that ICl is slack, we can thus conclude that
 0h (uh) =
  l (ul) @Sl(ul,uh)@uh +  h (uh)
S⇤h   uh
(36)
 0l (ul) =
 l (ul)
⇣
1  @Sl(ul,uh)@ul
⌘
Sl(ul, uh)  ul . (37)
Recall that u¯h < S⇤h by Lemma 3. Moreover, we must have Sl(ul, uh)   ul > 0 whenever uh > 0
(this follows from the argument in Step 2, Case 2 of Lemma 3). Hence, both derivatives are finite
over uh 2 (umh , u¯h). Q.E.D.
Claim 2 The mapping uˆl (uh) is di↵erentiable and satisfies (19).
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Proof Note from (37) that  0l (ul) is strictly positive at ul = uˆl (uh) for any uh 2 (umh , u¯h).
Thus, by the implicit function theorem, uˆ0l (uh) =
 0h(uh)
 0l(uˆl(uh))
, which is precisely (19). Q.E.D.
Claim 3 The ordinary di↵erential equation di↵erential equation (11) subject to uˆl(umh ) = 0 admits
a unique solution. Moreover, we have uˆ0l(uh) > 0 for all uh 2 [umh , S⇤h).
Proof As described above, (7), (8) and (19) imply that the support function uˆl must satisfy
uˆ0l(uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh) , (38)
where
h (ul, uh) =
Sl (ul, uh)  ul
S⇤h   uh
· 1 
pl
ph
@Sl
@uh
(ul, uh)
1  @Sl@ul (ul, uh)
, (39)
and where we impose the boundary condition uˆl (umh ) = 0. We now show that there exists a unique
solution uˆl (·) on [umh , S⇤h).
For any " 2 (0, S⇤h), the function h (·, ·) is Lipschitz continuous on
  (") ⌘ {(ul, uh) 2 [0, S⇤l ]⇥ [umh , S⇤h   ") : ul < uh} .
Hence, by the Picard-Lindelof theorem, for any " 2 (0, S⇤h), and for any (ul, uh) in the interior of
  ("), there is a unique local solution to uˆ0l (uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh). Local uniqueness will extend to
global uniqueness, guaranteeing that the equilibrium we construct is the only ordered equilibrium.
Now consider uˆ0l (uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh) with initial condition uˆl (u
m
h ) = 0 and note the existence of
⌘ > 0 such that a unique solution exists on [umh , u
m
h + ⌘] where (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains in   (0). We now
show that h (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains bounded and that (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains in   (0) also as uh increases
to S⇤h, implying the existence of a global solution to uˆ
0
l (uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh) on [u
m
h , S
⇤
h). We further
show that h (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains strictly positive on [umh , S
⇤
h), that is, we have uˆ
0
l(uh) > 0,which
ensures that the equilibrium we construct is ordered. The problem should be considered for two
regions of uh: we show that there exists a value uch 2 (umh , S⇤h) such that uch   uˆl (uch) = q⇤l ✓ and
such that uh  uˆl (uh) < q⇤l ✓ for uh 2 [umh , uch). We then show that uh  uˆl (uh) > q⇤l ✓ for uh > uch.
First, we show that, for uh > umh , provided uh  uˆl (uh) remains below q⇤l ✓, then h (uˆl (uh) , uh)
remains in (0, 1). First, note that Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)   uˆl (uh) remains strictly positive: this follows
because dduh [Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)] > 0 whenever Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh) is su ciently close to
zero.
Second, h (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains below 1 because
S⇤h   uh   (Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh))
= ✓hq
⇤
h   ' (q⇤h)  (✓lql (uˆl (uh) , uh)  ' (ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)))  ql (uˆl (uh) , uh) ✓
= ✓hq
⇤
h   ' (q⇤h)  (✓hql (uˆl (uh) , uh)  ' (ql (uˆl (uh) , uh)))
> 0 (40)
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and plph
@Sl
@uh
(uˆl (uh) , uh) >
@Sl
@ul
(uˆl (uh) , uh) whenever uh   uˆl (uh) < q⇤l ✓. Finally, to check that
h (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains strictly positive, we note that
pl
ph
@Sl
@uh
(uˆl (uh) , uh) < 1 provided uh  uˆl (uh) >
umh , which is guaranteed in turn by the initial condition and that h (uˆl (uh) , uh) remains less than 1.
We now verify the existence of uch 2 (umh , S⇤h) for which uch   uˆl (uch) = q⇤l ✓. Suppose that
there is no such value uch. Then the equalities in (40) must continue to hold for all uh 2 (umh , S⇤h).
Since these expressions are bounded above zero, we must have Sl (uˆl (uh) , uh)   uˆl (uh) < 0 as uh
approaches S⇤h, contradicting the observation in the previous claim.
Next, consider extending the solution to uh 2 (uch, S⇤h). It is easily checked that uˆl (uh) =
S⇤l   ↵ (S⇤h   uh) with ↵ =
S⇤l  uˆl(uch)
S⇤h uch 2 (0, 1) satisfies uˆ
0
l (uh) = h (uˆl (uh) , uh) and remains in   (0)
(that uˆl (uh) remains below S⇤l follows because S
⇤
l   uˆl (uh) = ↵ (S⇤h   uh) > 0).Q.E.D.
Claim 4 The Incentive Constraint ICl is globally satisfied.
Proof The argument in Claim 3hat there is uch 2 (umh , S⇤h) for which uh   uˆl(uh) <  ✓q⇤l for all
uh < uch. For uh 2 [uch, S⇤h) we have
uh   uˆl(uh) = (uh   S⇤l ) + ↵ (S⇤h   uh) . (41)
Notice that the derivative of the RHS of (41) w.r.t. uh is 1 ↵ > 0. Hence (41) achieves its maximum
at uh = S⇤h and its maximum is given by
S⇤h   S⇤l =  ✓q⇤l +
ˆ q⇤h
q⇤l
 
✓h   '0(q)
 
dq <  ✓q⇤h.
Thus we conclude that uh   uˆl(uh) 2 ( ✓q⇤l , ✓q⇤h) for all uh 2 (uch, S⇤h). Therefore, the incentive
constraint (16) does not bind along the curve (uˆl (uh) , uh) .Q.E.D.
Claim 5 There exists a unique u¯h 2 (uch, S⇤h) such that if we define Fh : [uch, u¯h] by
⇤ (Fh(uh)|v)
X
k=l,h
pk · (Sk(uˆl(uh), uh)  uˆk(uh))
=
X
k=l,h
pk · ⇤ (0|v) · (Sk(uml , umh )  umk ) := ⇡⇤,
then Fh is a strictly increasing and absolutely continuous function satisfying Fh (uch) = 0 and
Fh (u¯h) = 1.
Proof As noted above (see Step 4 in the proof of Lemma 3), the least generous equilibrium
menu must be (uml , u
m
h ) . Moreover, in equilibrium, all o↵ers must yield the same expected profit ⇡
⇤.
Next, observe that there is a value u¯h > umh which solves
⇤ (1|v)
X
k=l,h
pk · (Sk(uˆl(u¯h), uh)  uˆk(u¯h)) = ⇡⇤
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The existence of such u¯h is guaranteed by the intermediate value theorem, since
⇤(1|v)
⇤(0|v) 2 (1,1) and
since limuh"S⇤h [Sl(uˆl (uh) , uh)  uˆl (uh)] = limuh"S⇤h [S⇤h   uh] = 0.
Condition (12) is then simply the requirement that
⇤ (Fh(uh)|v)
X
k=l,h
pk · (Sk(uˆl(uh), uh)  uˆk(uh)) = ⇡⇤
for uh 2 [umh , u¯h] where Fh(u¯h) = 1. Note then that dduh
hP
k=l,h pk · (Sk(uˆl(uh), uh)  uˆk(uh))
i
< 0
on (umh , u¯h). This follows because
d
duh
[uh   uˆl(uh)] > 0 and uh   uˆl(uh) > umh , and because
uˆ0l(uh) > 0. Hence, Assumption 1.1 and 1.2 imply that Fh is uniquely defined by (12) and is
increasing and absolutely continuous on (umh , u¯h). Q.E.D.
Claim 6 We have @uˆl(uh,pl)@pl < 0 for all uh 2 (umh , u¯h) .
Proof. Let u˘h (·) be the inverse of uˆl (·) . It is slightly more convenient to show (the equivalent
result) that
@u˘h(uyl )
@pl
> 0 for all uyl 2 (0, uˆl (u¯h)) .Consider the equilibrium impact of an increase of
the probability of the low type from pal to p
b
l . We will show that if for j = a, b we have the utility
profile
⇣
ujl , u
j
h
⌘
is o↵ered in the economy in which the probability of the low type is pj then whenever
uAl = u
b
l we must have u
a
h < u
b
h.
First notice that an increase from pa to pb leads to a change in the monopolist menu changes
from
 
0, um,ah
 
to
⇣
0, um,bh
⌘
, with um,bh > u
m,a
h . Assume that
⇣
uyl , u˘
j
h(u
y
l )
⌘
is in the support of the
equilibrium j, for j = a, b. Clearly u˘bh(0) > u˘
a
h(0). By continuity, there exists " > 0 for which for all
uyl 2 [0, "] we have u˘bh(uyl ) > u˘ah(uyl ). If this inequality holds for all uyl such that
⇣
uyl , uˆ
j
h(u
y
l )
⌘
is in
the support of equilibria j, for j = a, b then so does the claim. If not, let u⇤l be the smallest low-type
utility for which u˘bh(u
⇤
l ) = u˘
a
h(u
⇤
l ).
First assume that u˘Ah (u
⇤
l )   u⇤l >  ✓q⇤L. In this case, we have u˘0ah (u⇤l ) = u˘0bh (u⇤l ) for all uyl in a
neighborhood of u⇤l , a contradiction to the minimality of u
⇤
l . Next assume that uˆ
a
h(u
⇤
l )  u⇤l <  ✓q⇤L.
In this case, we have
u˘0bh (u
⇤
l )
u˘0ah (u
⇤
l )
=
h
1 
⇣
pAl
pAh
⌘
· @Sl
@uyh
 
u⇤l , u˘
A
h (u
⇤
l )
 ih
1 
⇣
pBl
pBh
⌘
· @Sl
@uyh
 
u⇤l , u˘
B
h (u
⇤
l )
 i > 1,
which shows that u˘bh(u
y
l ) < u˘
a
h(u
y
l ) for all u
y
l in some interval (u
⇤
l   ", u⇤l ) , which contradicts the
definition of u⇤l .
Finally assume that u˘ah(u
⇤
l )  u⇤l =  ✓q⇤L. In this case, u˘bh(·)  u˘ah(·) achieves a local minimal at
u⇤l and hence since u˘
0b
h (u
⇤
l ) = u˘
0a
h (u
⇤
l ) we must have limuyl "u⇤l
⇥
u˘00bh (u
y
l )  u˘00bh (uyl )
⇤   0, which holds if
and only if limuyh"u˘h(u⇤l )
⇥
uˆ00bh (u
y
l )  uˆ00bh (uyl )
⇤  0. However, using (22) it follows that:
lim
uyh"u˘h(u⇤l )
@
⇥
uˆ00bh (u
y
l )  uˆ00bh (uyl )
⇤
@
⇣
pl
ph
⌘ = c00(q⇤l )
 
S⇤l   u⇤l
( ✓)2
⇥
S⇤h   u˘h(u⇤l )
⇤3
!
> 0,
11
a contradiction. Q.E.D.
The next proof use notation introduced before the proof of the Proposition 4.
Claim 7 Take p##l , p
#
l such that p
##
l < p
#
l and index all contracts by w. We have u
##
h (w) < u
#
h (w)
for all w 2
h
1, ⇤(1|v)⇤(0|v)
⌘
.
Proof. Suppose towards a contradiction that u##h (w)   u#h (w). Then we must have (using Claim
6) u##l (w) > u
#
l (w) and hence
⇣
p#l
⇣
S⇤l   u#l (w)
⌘
+ p#h
⇣
S⇤h   u#h (w)
⌘⌘
P
k=l,h p
#
k ·
⇣
Sk(0, u
m,#
h )  um,#k
⌘ >
⇣
p##l
⇣
S⇤l   u#l (w)
⌘
+ p##h
⇣
S⇤h   u#h (w)
⌘⌘
P
k=l,h p
##
k ·
⇣
Sk(0, u
m,#
h )  um,#k
⌘
>
⇣
p##l
⇣
S⇤l   u##l (w)
⌘
+ p##h
⇣
S⇤h   u##h (w)
⌘⌘
P
k=l,h p
##
k ·
⇣
Sk(0, u
m,##
h )  um,##k
⌘ .
The first inequality follows because firms that o↵er more generous menus earn a higher fraction
of their profits from low types. Hence, the increase in ph associated with p
##
h increases profits
proportionally more at the monopoly menu than at the menu associated to the ranking y(w). The
second inequality follows because um,##h is chosen optimally for
⇣
p##l , p
##
h
⌘
, and because u##h (w)  
u#h (w) and u
##
l (w) > u
#
l (w). But this contradicts that
⇣
u#l (w) , u
#
h (w)
⌘
and
⇣
u##l (w) , u
##
h (w)
⌘
are both equilibrium menus leading to the generosity w (which would require the first and last ratios
to instead be equal to 1w ). We conclude that u
##
h (w) < u
#
h (w) . Q.E.D.
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